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INTRODUCTION 
Though legally sovereign, Estonia along with some other states of Eastern Europe was part of 
an ideological, political, economic and military block, dominated by a neighbouring 
superpower.  After the collapse of this regime, it was necessary for Estonia to take efforts to 1
return to the family of democratic states and to open itself up to a democratisation process.   2
One of the steps of this undertaking was the ratification of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (the Convention) on 13 March 1996.  The ECHR  is an international treaty 3 4
drawn up within the Council of Europe, which was established in Strasbourg in 1949 in the 
course of the first post-war attempt to unify Europe, institutionalise shared democratic values 
and provide a safeguard against the spread of communism from the Soviet Union to European 
states.   5
The Convention is a living instrument that needs to be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions. An ongoing judicial dialogue between national courts and the European Court of 
Human  Rights   (the  Strasbourg  Court,  the  ECtHR  or  the  Court)  is  essential  for  the 
development of human rights.  This dialogue largely depends on the degree to which the 6
Court respects national sensitivities and traditions.  7
Since 1996, there have been 52 judgments and 99 decisions on the admissibility in relation to 
the applications submitted against Estonia compared to more than 18 000 judgments when it 
comes to other countries during the same period of time. Moreover, there have been no pilot 
judgments in relation to Estonia that could have identified the structural problems underlying 
repetitive cases and imposed an obligation to address those problems.  Estonia is not one of 8
 D. Thomas. The Helsinki Accords and Political Change in Eastern Europe. Published in T. Risse, S. Ropp, K. 1
Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1999, p 233.
 J. Laffranque. European Human Rights Law and Estonia: One- or Two-way Street? - Juridica International, Vol 2
23, Issue 4, 2015, p 4.
 K. Merusk, M. Susi. Ten Years after Ratification. The European Convention on Human Rights and Its Impact 3
on Estonia. - German Yearbook of International Law, Vol 48, 2005, p 327.
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 03.09.1953. ETS no 5.4
 A. Donald, J. Gordon, P. Leach. Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 83. The UK and the 5
European Court of Human Rights. Available online: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/
83._european_court_of_human_rights.pdf (10.04.2018), p 6.
 J. Rinceanu. Judicial dialogue between the European Court of Human Rights and national supreme courts. 6
Available online: http://crime-in-crisis.com/en/?p=287 (10.04.2018), p 1038.
 J. Gerards, J.Fleuren (eds.). Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the 7
Judgments of the ECtHR in National Case Law. A comparative analysis. Antwerp: Intersentia 2014, p 88.
 European Court of Human Rights. Factsheet – Pilot judgments. Available online: https://www.echr.coe.int/8
Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf (10.04.2018).
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the top ten countries in terms of the number of filed complaints.  However, in the year of 9
2017, the average number of applications concerning Estonia allocated per 10 000 inhabitants 
was  1,19;  that  noticeably  exceeds  the  average  number  of  applications  in  relation  to  the 
Council of Europe Member States (0,76).10
The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the Court’s dialogue with Estonia through its 
judgments, dealing with the applications submitted against the state, has influenced the law of 
EU Member States and EU law in general. The hypothesis of this written work is that Estonia 
has influenced the ECtHR case law and through that EU law. In order to determine whether or 
not the hypothesis is right, the author should investigate whether case law of ECHR legally 
can and in fact did influence the law of the EU institutions and Member States in the first 
place. It is also necessary to evaluate the impact the rulings against Estonia have made on the 
case law of the ECtHR. No additional enquiries in relation to the factual use of those 
decisions in the domestic courts were made in pursuance of limiting the scope of the research 
and fulfilling the requirements for the allowable length of the thesis. In addition to this, there 
are some difficulties based on the fact that a national court may accept that a human right is in 
issue, but not refer specifically to the ECtHR and its decisions.  The same is true in relation 11
to political decisions. In such cases, it is nearly impossible to evaluate the impact of the 
judgments, in which Estonia was the defendant state, on law of each of EU Member States, 
without “an in-depth understanding of the formal legal rules that exist within the respective 
systems and also of the socio-political context broadly understood in which those rules have 
evolved and developed.”   12
Each chapter of this thesis is based on relevant legal textbooks and academic articles. In 
addition to this, the author analyzed the case law of the ECtHR, related judgments of the 
Court of Jusictie of the European Union (the Luxembourg Court, the CJEU) and the Supreme 
Court of Estonia. The sources for this thesis include written works of the professors and 
lecturers of Utrecht and Ghent Universities, Vienna University of Economics and Business, 
Geneva University, the University of Manchester, the University of Cambridge.  
 J. Laffranque. Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohus ja Eesti õigus: kas monoloog või dialoog? - Juridica, Issue 8, 2016, 9
p 540.
 European Court of Human Rights. Analysis of statistics 2017. Available online: https://www.echr.coe.int/10
Documents/Stats_analysis_2017_ENG.pdf (10.04.2018), p 11.
 L. Woods. Freedom of Expression in the European Union. - European Public Law, Vol 12, Issue 3, 2006, p 11
391.
 B. Stirn, D. Fairgrieve, M. Guyomar. Droits et libertés en France et au Royaume-Uni. Paris: Odile Jacob 2006, 12
p 7.
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The author of this study used the evaluation of the importance of the judgments provided in 
HUDOC  - the official database that gives access to the case law of the Court. The decisions 13
are marked by their level of importance. The most significant rulings are published or selected 
for publication in the Court’s official Reports of Judgments and Decisions - Case Reports. 
Only two of the judgments, Tammer v. Estonia  and Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2),  and four 14 15
decisions on admissibility in the cases against Estonia have been published in Case Reports. 
In addition to this, one of the recent judgments - Delfi AS v. Estonia  - has also been selected 16
to be published. This judgment has also inspired an active discussion in legal journals, 
seconded by Tammer.  17
The author of this thesis limited the primary analysis to those three judgments mentioned 
above. An exception was made for two the decisions on admissibility - Kolk and Kislyiy  and 18
Penart  due to the fact that these judgments were necessary to analyze the influence of 19
Veeber (no. 2).  
In addition to this, a brief study revealed those judgments against Estonia that were quoted the 
most in the Court’s case law in relation to a particular article of the Convention: Tammer, 
Veeber  (no. 2) and Delfi (despite being adjudicated only three years ago). The percentages of 
quotations for the decisions on admissibility other than Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia were very 
small. This also allowed to limit the scope of the research. 
General principles of the most relevant articles of the ECHR discussed in a chosen judgment 
were described and compared with the reasoning of the Court in a particular decision. It was 
then analyzed if a particular decision has influenced the subsequent case law of the Court, 
whether the Court of Justice of the European Union or the Supreme Court of Estonia, as the 
court of a Member State, used any of the principles of a decision in their judgments. It was 
also examined if there was any other indication of influence, for example, in legal literature.  
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one addresses a theoretical possibility of the 
case law of the ECtHR to influence the law of EU and its Member States. Moreover, it briefly 
describes if this impact has indeed occurred. Chapter two discusses a possible influence of 
 HUDOC - Council of Europe. Accessible online: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int (10.04.2018).13
 ECtHR 41205/98, 06.02.2001, Tammer v. Estonia. 14
 ECtHR 45771/99, 21.01.2003, Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2).15
 ECtHR 64569/09, 16.06.2015, Delfi AS v. Estonia.16
 The author’s personal conclusion based on a comparison of available materials. 17
 ECtHR 23052/04, 24018/04, 17.01.2006, Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia (dec.).18
 ECtHR 14685/04, 24.01.2006, Penart v. Estonia (dec.).19
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Veeber (no. 2). This case concerned the retrospective application of criminal law by Estonian 
courts.  
An overview of the influence of the judgments concerning the freedom of speech in the cases 
against Estonia is found in chapters three and four of the current thesis. The problem of 
balancing the freedom of speech (Article 10 of the ECHR) against the right to respect for 
one’s private and family life (Article 8 of the ECHR) is extremely important and is currently 
gaining even bigger significance. It is based on the intensification of both commercial and 
user-generated expressive activity on the Internet.  Issues relating to the Internet changing 20
the reality and everyday life of the Europeans are so pressing that even cases dealing with the 
surveillance of Internet usage in the workplace have started to reach the ECtHR.  On the 21
other hand, it can often be found concurring with the right to respect for one’s private and 
family life, embodying central democratic and societal concerns. It also contains a 
commercial element, thus reflecting some of the tensions inherent within the EU system 
itself  and reveal the dialogue between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts. 22
The scope of the research on a topic of the ECtHR case law relating to Estonia is usually 
limited by the influence of the case law on the democratic development of Estonia, not the 
other way around.  Only one of the recent academic articles  and one of the chapters of a 23 24
new book on the relationship between the ECtHR and Estonian law  address the same issue 25
as the thesis at hand. In both of these written works it was established that there was, indeed, a 
dialogue, not a monologue, between the ECtHR and Estonia. The judgments in which Estonia 
was the defendant state were found to influence the case law of the ECtHR and its later case 
law applied to other states.  In particular, the biggest impact was discovered in relation to the 26
right  to  freedom  of  expression,  the  conditions  of  detention,  the  extension of  a  pre-trial 27
detention.    28
The following keywords could be used to characterise this thesis: human rights, international 
courts of law and European Union law.
 UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 20
Opinion and Expression, Report to the Human Rights Council A/HRC/17/27, 2011, para 74.
 ECtHR 61496/08, 05.09.2017, Bărbulescu v. Romania.21
 L. Woods. Freedom of Expression in the European Union. - European Public Law, Vol 12, Issue 3, p 373.22
 J. Laffranque (note 9), p 540.23
 J. Laffranque (note 9).24
 J. Laffranque. Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohus ja Eesti õigus. Tallinn: Juura 2017, p 99. 25
 J. Laffranque (note 9), p 551; J. Laffranque (note 23), p 99.26
 J. Laffranque (note 9), p 551; J. Laffranque (note 23), p 109.27
 J. Laffranque (note 9), p 551; J. Laffranque (note 23), p 110.28
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1. Legal Ability of Case Law of European Court of Human Rights to 
Influence Law of European Union and its Member States 
1.1. Relationship between European Court of Human Rights and European 
Union 
Within Europe, both the Council of Europe and the European Union ensure human rights at 
the same supranational level. On the one hand, there is the Council of Europe, which 
functions on the basis of the Convention and through its Court. On the other hand, there is the 
EU, which operates through the CJEU and ensures that all of its Member States act in 
conformity with the EU human rights standards.   29
The CJEU has to regard the ECHR as one of the lawful criteria for examining the impact of 
EU Regulations and Directives in the specific field of human rights after the judgment of 
Rutili delivered in 1975.  In Wachauf  the CJEU ruled that Member States are obliged to 30 31
respect fundamental rights when implementing Community law.  In addition to this, in ERT 32
the CJEU pointed out that the Convention has special significance in that respect.  As a 33
result, the case law of the ECtHR has often been cited by the Luxembourg judges in their 
decisions.  This tradition is so deeply rooted in the Luxembourg Court that the judges 34
recognize their personal tendency to read and consider similar Strasbourg judgments before 
providing their opinions.  35
The EU has legislative and executive jurisdiction by which it may act against Member States 
or private persons in a way that impacts upon their Convention obligations and rights. When 
exercising jurisdiction in this ways, it is possible that EU institutions may infringe the 
Convention rights.  In the case of Matthews v. the United Kingdom, the Court observed that 36
 N. Van Belle. The Judicial Protection of Human Rights in Europe after the Accession of the European Union 29
to the European Convention on Human Rights. - Inter-American and European Human Rights Journal, Vol 6, 
2013, p 74.
 B. Fan. European Pluralism on the Protection of Fundamental Rights: The European Convention on Human 30
Rights vis-a-vis the EU Legal Order. - National Taiwan University Law Review, Vol 11, Issue 2, 2016, p 333; 
C-36/75, 28.10.1975, Roland Rutili v. Ministre de l’intérieur.
 C-5/88, 13.07.1989, Hubert Wachauf v. Bundesamtfir Erncihrungund Forstwirtschaft, p 17.31
 H. Gencaga. The Past, Present and Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Prediction. - Anglo-32
German Law Journal, Vol 1, 2015, p 164.
 C-260/89, 18 June 1991. - Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon 33
Prossopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others, p 41.
 B. Fan, p 353.34
 S. Morano-Foadi, S. Andreadakis. Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon: The 35
European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights. - European Law Journal, Vol 17, Issue 5, 2011, p 601.
 D. Harris, M. O'Boyle, E. Bates, C. Buckley. Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention 36
on Human Rights. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, p 38.
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acts of the EU as such cannot be challenged before the Court because the EU is not a 
Contracting Party.  They can, however, be successfully disputed before the CJEU  if there is 37 38
a breach of fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR. Those rights constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law under Article 6(3) of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the TEU 
and the TEEC.  It follows that the application and the interpretation of the Convention 39
remain for the CJEU, not the Convention’s own court.  As long as the ECtHR lacks the 40
jurisdiction over the EU, Member States may be also required to bear the burden for 
violations that are a product of the EU’s action.  There is a presumption, however, that a 41
State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it implements legal 
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation if an equivalent protection of 
fundamental rights is considered to be provided by the organisation. This presumption can be 
rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, the protection of Convention rights was 
considered manifestly deficient.  In such cases, the interest of international cooperation 42
would be outweighed by the Convention.  The immunity allowed by the Bosphorus case 43
does not apply where the state has some discretion in its application of EU law. The state is 
expected to exercise its discretion consistently with the Convention.  Moreover, it is only 44
applicable in the cases where the deployment of the full potential of the supervisory 
mechanism provided for by EU law took place.  This second condition should be applied 45
without excessive formalism and taking into account the specific features of the supervisory 
mechanism in question. For example, it would serve no useful purpose to make the 
implementation of the Bosphorus presumption subject to a requirement for the domestic court 
to request a ruling from the CJEU in all cases without exception, including those cases where 
no genuine and serious issue arises with regard to the protection of fundamental rights by EU 
law or those in which the CJEU has already stated precisely how the applicable provisions of 
EU law should be interpreted in a manner compatible with fundamental rights.   46
 ECtHR 24833/94, 18.02.1999, Matthews v. the United Kingdom, para 32.37
 D. Harris, M. O'Boyle, E. Bates, C. Buckley, p 39.38
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 39
Community.  OJ C306/01, 2007.
 D. Harris, M. O'Boyle, E. Bates, C. Buckley, p 39.40
 L. Eaton. Protecting Fundamental Rights Or Autonomy: Will the European Union's Accession to the European 41
Convention of Human Rights Affect Its Legal Autonomy. - Penn Undergraduate Law Journal, Vol 1, Issue 2, 
2014, p 109. 
 ECtHR 45036/98, 30.06.2005, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, para 156.42
 ECtHR 15318/89, 18.12.1996, Loizidou v. Turkey, para 56.43
 D. Harris, M. O'Boyle, E. Bates, C. Buckley, p 30; ECtHR 12323/11, 06.12.2012, Michaud v. France, para 44
103.
 ECtHR 12323/11, 06.12.2012, Michaud v. France, para 113. 45
 ECtHR 17502/07, 23.05.2016, Avotiņš v. Latvia, para 109.46
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Article 6(2) of the treaty of Lisbon states that the EU shall accede to the ECHR. However, the 
CJEU Opinion 2/13  has temporarily blocked this long-expected development. The opinion 47
reiterates that the fundamental principle that the supreme role of the Luxembourg Court is 
exclusively prohibited to be undermined by any international agreement under the EU legal 
order.  The Luxembourg Court might lose its autonomous and authoritative status if it 48
recognizes the binding effects of Strasbourg decision.   49
The two European Courts, however, are expected to engage in a common European program 
on the fundamental rights protection. Both of them need to get legitimacy and inspiration 
from their counterpart’s decisions, while they preserve their autonomy in the multilevel 
protection of human rights.  50
As for this inspiration, the Strasbourg Court remains the last “conscience” in human rights 
questions, a last legal instance or decision-making body,  an instrument of increased moral 51
and political legitimacy for the EU.  Research shows that naming and shaming strategies 52
improve human rights conditions when they are directed against states that have formally 
joined a particular treaty regime.  53
The Court’s judgments serve not only to decide those cases brought before it but, more 
generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention.  The 54
contribution of the ECtHR thus helps to clarify and strengthen the human rights system in the 
EU and ideally to decrease the need for judicial remedies.  Тhe Court considers the 55
Convention to be a living instrument and aims to render its rights practical and effective.  It 56
could be said that the Court succeeded in its mission - the Convention is still regarded as the 
 Opinion 2/13 on the EU Accession to the ECHR, 2014 E.C.R. 2454.47
 B. Fan, p 336.48
 B. Fan, p 350.49
 B. Fan, p 372.50
 C. Grabenwarter. The European Convention on Human Rights: Inherent Constitutional Tendencies and the 51
Role of the European Court of Human Rights. - ELTE Law Journal, Vol 2014, Issue 1, 2014, p 115.
 G. de Burca, J. Aschenbrenner. The Development of European Constitutionalism and the Role of the EU 52
Charter of Fundamental Rights. - Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol 9, Issue 3, 2003, p 380.
 R. Goodman, D. Jinks. Social Mechanisms to Promote International Human Rights: Complementary or 53
Contradictory. Published in T. Risse, S. Ropp, K. Sikkink (eds.). The Persistent Power of Human Rights. From 
Commitment to Compliance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014, p 118.
 ECtHR 5310/71, 18.01.1978, Ireland v. United Kingdom, para 154; ECtHR 7367/76, 06.11.1980, Guzzardi v. 54
Italy, para 86.
 G. De Baere, A.-L. Chane, J. Wouters. International Courts as Keepers of the Rule of Law: Achievements, 55
Challenges, and Opportunities. - New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol 48, Issue 3, 
2016, p 782.
 G. De Baere, J. Wouters (eds.). The Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law. 56
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2015, p 227.
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main source  and an effective method  of protection of human rights in Europe. Overall, the 57 58
case law of the Court has a strong influence on EU law.  59
1.2. Factual Influence of Case Law of  European Court of Human Rights on 
Member States 
There are some possible limitations on the implementation of the principles of the case law of 
the ECtHR. They could potentially diminish the practical value of the decisions against 
Estonia on a national level in Member States. These probable limitations include a lack of 
familiarity with Strasbourg judgments; a lack of awareness about the possibility for domestic 
courts to rely on international legal norms;  a doubt in the reliability of decisions that were 60
adopted decades ago and thus do not reflect changed circumstances within a society.   61
However,  there  is  another  important  aspect  to  address. The final judgment of the Court is 
binding only in relation to the parties of particular proceedings.  It follows that the legal 62
status of  the Strasbourg case law is  diverse among the Contracting States.  It  depends on 
domestic  constitutional  rules  or  Constitutional  (Supreme)  Court  jurisprudence.  The 63
judgments  have indicative  and declamatory effect:  they hold whether  or  not  a  state  has 64
breached  its  obligation  under  the  Convention.  The  Court  cannot  annul  the  domestic  act 
concerned nor can it decide in lieu of the domestic authority.  However, recent developments 65
show that the Court can and will advice in its judgments as to how its decisions should be 
implemented.  Moreover, in cases of continuing human rights violations, states are expected 66
to put an end to it.67
The Belgian Cour Constitutionnelle uses the technique of consistent interpretation, taking into 
account the case law of the ECtHR and showing its readiness even to revise its previous case 
 H. Gencaga, p 177.57
 B. Virjan. Principle of Non-Retroactivity of Criminal Law according to Article 7 of the European Convention 58
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. - Law Annals from Titu Maiorescu University, 
Vol 2012, 2012, p 95.
 A. Lazowski. R. Wessel. When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European Union to 59
the ECHR. - German Law Journal, Vol 16, Issue 1, 2015, p 211.
 K. Merusk, M. Susi, p 365.60
 R. Masterman. Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: Binding Domestic Courts to Strasbourg? - Public 61
Law, Vol 12, 2004, p 725. 
 Article 46 ECHR.62
 B. Fan, p 350.63
 C. Grabenwarter, p 107.64
 M. Villiger. Binding Effect and Declaratory Nature of the Judgments of the ECtHR. Published in A. Seibert-65
Fohr, M. Villiger (eds.). Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights – Effects and Implementation. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2015, p 33.
 A. Seibert-Fohr, M. Villiger (note 65), p 35; L. Sicilianos. The Role of the ECtHR in the Execution of its own 66
Judgments: Reflections on Article 46 ECHR. Published in A. Seibert-Fohr, M. Villiger (note 65), p 315.
 ECtHR 71503/01, 08.04.2004, Assanidze v. Georgia, para 198.67
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law if needed.  The Supreme Court of Denmark regularly consults the case law of the 68
ECtHR.   69
In Italy, as an aftermath of two decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court in 2007,  the 70
decisions of the ECtHR do have an impact on Italian law. They give a noticeable contribution 
to the interpretation of the Conventional provisions integrated within the Italian sources of 
law. The Constitutional provision states that national legislation shall be compliant with 
international conventions to which Italy adheres.   71
In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the Supreme Courts expressly agreed to be bound by the 
ECtHR’s case law even when they interpret their national Constitution.  Many acts have been 72
adopted or changed in order to comply with the standards of the Convention as they have 
been developed in the case law of the ECtHR in Lithuania.  The Supreme Court of Lithuania 73
frequently refers to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as well.  Deep influence of the 74
judgments of the ECtHR was also noted in Latvia. This huge impact could be explained by 
the need to facilitate a smooth transition from the Socialist law to that of modern Continental 
Europe and lack of corresponding human rights traditions.   75
Both France and the Netherlands are also incredibly open to the Convention. The ECHR is 
directly applicable before French courts and is expected to complement and remedy the 
shortcomings of domestic law.  French courts often refer to ECtHR decisions as binding 76
precedents.  Adjusting legislation is a frequently occurring consequence of rulings by the 77
ECtHR in the Netherlands. Sometimes it can take the form of the implementation of a 
 G. Martinico. Is the European Convention Going to Be ‘Supreme’? A Comparative-Constitutional Overview 68
of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts. - European Journal of International Law, Vol 23, Issue 2, 2012, p 
412.
 G. Martinico, p 412.69
 Constitutional Court of Italy, 22.10.2007, Nos 348 and 349.70
 L. Busatta. End of Life Issues in Italy: Between Case Law and (Still Missing) Legislation. - Digest: National 71
Italian American Bar Association Law Journal, Vol 25, 2017, p 62.
 A. Kjeldgaard-Pedersen (ed.). Nordic Approaches to International Law. Leiden: Brill - Nijhoff 2017, p 3.72
 D. Jočiené. Lithuanina: The ECHR in the Lithuanian Legal System: the Lessons Learned and Perspectives for 73
the Future. Published in I. Motoc, I. Ziemele (eds.). The Impact of the ECHR on Democratic Change in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016, p 240.
 I. Motoc, I. Ziemele (note 73), p 259.74
 M. Mits. Latvia: Consolidating Democratic Changes in Latvia: the Various Roles of the ECHR. Published in I. 75
Motoc, I. Ziemele (note 73), p 201.
 E. Bjorge, p 21.76
 L. Cohen-Tanugi. Case Law in a Legal System Without Binding Precedent: The French Example. Available 77
online: https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/17-laurent-cohen-tanugi/ (10.04.2018).
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completely new act or an adjustment of the policy of the executive branch. None of the Dutch 
state powers will escape being influenced by the ECHR through the case law of the Court.  78
However, Austrian Constitutional Court stressed the possibility of departing from the ECtHR 
case law if the opposite would entail a violation of the Constitution.  79
Moreover, the courts of United Kingdom must “take into account” the case law of the 
Strasbourg court and decide accordance with Convention rights, “so far as it is possible to do 
so.”  According to Lord Philips in the R v. Horncastle & Others, the requirement to “take 80
into account” the Strasbourg jurisprudence will normally result in applying principles that are 
clearly established by the Strasbourg Court. There will, however, be rare occasions of concern 
as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates 
particular aspects of the domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for 
adopting this course and hoping the Strasbourg Court would reconsider the particular aspect 
of its decision.  To sum up, the United Kingdom explicitly denies the Strasbourg’s automatic 81
binding status in the domestic legal order,  yet is still open to apply principles that are clearly 82
established by the Strasbourg Court. 
The binding effect of the ECtHR judgments in Germany derives from Article 46 ECHR in 
conjunction with the domestic legislation and case law.  The authorities can, however, 83
deviate from the ECtHR judgments, but only exceptionally and if the execution of the 
decision would imply a violation of the constitution.  The ECHR and the case law of the 84
Court are to help in the interpretation of the extensive rights catalogue of the German 
constitution and the robust municipal rights.  However, if an adverse ruling contests an 85
aspect of the legal culture in Germany or an evolved interpretation of the domestic law, 
national authorities may be reluctant to implement it.  86
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Review, Vol  9, Issue 2, 2013, p 83.
 G. Martinico, p 422.79
 E. Bjorge. National Supreme Courts and the Development of ECHR Rights. - International Journal of 80
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Overall, the role of the case law of the ECtHR for the development of national legal systems 
cannot be appreciated enough.  Sometimes the Court uncovers serious structural problems 87
that can only be solved through adaptation and amendment of the legal system and gives 
guidelines to these changes. Besides that, it increasingly supplements national human rights 
guarantees.  The Court carefully repeats the principles developed in its case law and thus sets 88
an example for domestic courts.  However, it is in no way the Court’s task to take the place 89
of the competent national courts but rather to review the decisions they delivered in the 
exercise of their power of appreciation.  90
Brief analysis at hand shows that despite potential limitations mentioned above and 
differences in the legal status of the Strasbourg case law among the Contracting States, there 
has been a consistent and noticeable influence of the case law of the ECtHR on the law of EU 
Member States. This impact is most likely to grow as the Court continues to advice on the 
implementation of its judgments and criticize repetitive failures of the national authorities to 
comply. For example, the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of the detention in Hungary 
that amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention in 
multiple recent cases.  That impact, present and future, in turn, creates a possibility for the 91
decisions in the cases submitted against Estonia to influence the law of EU Member States. 
Considering that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR, constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law, the influence of the decisions of the ECtHR in the legal 
disputes submitted against Estonia is possible not only on a domestic level but also on the 
Union level. This, however, presupposes that some new principles of high practical value 
were developed in the cases where Estonia was the defendant state. The next chapters are 
aimed to investigate this aspect in more detail.  
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2. Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2) 
2.1. Principle of Legality  
Rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the 
Articles of the Convention.  Essential to the rule of law is the principle of legality. It is 92
embodied in Article 7 of the Convention:  no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence 93
on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national 
or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. It 
should be noted that finding an offence to be “criminal” for the purposes of the Convention is 
not limited to criteria laid down in national law. “Criminal” thus, has an autonomous meaning 
under the Convention, and offenses that are considered to be administrative offenses or are in 
other ways classified as non-criminal under national law may be viewed by the court as 
criminal in the context of Article 7.  94
The guarantee of legality occupies a prominent place in the Convention system of protection. 
It is also underlined by the fact that no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 in 
time of war or another public emergency. It should be construed and applied, as follows from 
its object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary 
prosecution, conviction and punishment.  In a larger sense, this principle underpins the rule 95
of law.   96
Two forms of retroactivity of the law can be derived from the wording of Article 7. Both of 
those forms are prohibited for legislatures and the courts  and must be taken into account by 97
the ECtHR. On one hand, the retroactivity of the law in a broad sense, namely of a legal 
norm, which is also called direct retroactivity, and, on the other hand, the retroactivity of the 
interpretation of the legal norm by the court, which is also called indirect retroactivity.  The 98
 ECtHR 31107/96, 25.03.1999, Iatridis v. Greece, para 58.92
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principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law is not violated by retroactive application of a 
more lenient criminal regulation according to the ECtHR.  99
The principle of legality is multifaceted and incorporates the principle of legal certainty.  100
According to the case law of the Court, it follows from Article 7 that an offence must be 
clearly defined in law. The term “law” has an autonomous meaning under the Convention, and 
includes judge-made law as well as legislation, and delegated legislation as well as primary 
legislation.  The Court considers the “law” to be the provision in force as the competent 101
courts have interpreted it.  Hence it follows that the offences, as well as the relevant 102
penalties, must be defined as detailed as possible.  However, whilst certainty is highly 103
desirable, it may cause excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing 
circumstances.   104
For example, in Steel v. the United Kingdom, the Court accepted that, although provisions 
such as “breach of the peace” or “being of good behaviour” were imprecise, vague and 
general, their meaning had either been sufficiently clarified by the national courts - in the case 
of “breach of the peace” - or was sufficiently comprehensible by the applicants - the 
requirement “to be of good behaviour” as a condition of being bound over to keep the peace 
as a criminal penalty.  105
The requirement of legal certainty is satisfied where the individual can know from the 
wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ 
interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him or her criminally liable.  In 106
addition to this, Article 7 of the Convention cannot be read as outlawing the gradual 
clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, 
provided that the resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and 
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could reasonably be foreseen.  In other words, the core point in this connection is whether 107
the accused can foresee the criminal consequences of an intended act.  In that regard, the 108
Court's interpretation provides a minimum upon which the Member States and other European 
courts build.  The ECtHR’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an 109
interpretation are compatible with the Convention  regarding both the definition of an 110
offence and the penalty the offence in question carries.  111
For a criminal law to deter a given conduct, that individual must understand that this conduct 
is the subject of a criminal law and if carried out will result in criminal punishment.  This 112
enables each community to regulate itself according to the norms prevailing in the society.  113
It does not only ensure respect for the rule of law but also helps to reduce potential costs of 
litigation. A firm understanding of the prohibited conduct is also important for the 
achievement of retribution, particularly if such retribution aims to communicate the 
wrongfulness of the behaviour in question to the accused.  114
The Court has developed two different standards in regard to the requirement of 
“foreseeability”. One of them is “common sense” - the individuals must be able to foresee the 
consequences under the criminal law of pursuing illegal activities.  However, the court also 115
expects more than simple common sense from an individual employed in a professional 
capacity. Professionals are expected to consult the law relevant to their position  or to take 116
an appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail.  117
When it comes to the judgments in which Estonia was the defendant state, the best example of 
the application of the principles described in this subchapter is the judgment of the ECtHR in 
the case Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2).  
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2.2. Judgment of European Court of Human Rights in Veeber v. Estonia (no. 
2) 
The applicant, Tiit Veeber, was convicted for the offences committed from 1993 to 1996  118
under criminal legislation that had come into force in 1995. The applicant submitted that his 
acts prior to 13 January 1995 did not qualify as criminal under the law in force at that time. 
He pointed out that, as worded prior to that date, the relevant provision made the existence of 
a previous administrative penalty for a similar offence a precondition for a criminal 
conviction for the acts defined therein. However, no such penalty had been imposed on 
him.  Therefore, the applicant believed his conviction amounted to the retrospective 119
application of criminal law in breach of Article 7(1) of the Convention.   120
The Government submitted that the applicant had been given a clear indication in the bill of 
indictment of the acts of which he was accused, their legal qualification and the reasons for 
qualifying those acts as a continuing offence. The case law of the Supreme Court of Estonia 
also demonstrated that the relevant provision was applicable to acts of intentional and 
continuing tax evasion even before the amendment if the criminal activity had continued after 
it came into force. The domestic courts had given sufficiently detailed reasons for their 
decision to qualify the acts committed by the applicant as a continuing offence and to rely on 
all of them as the basis for convicting him.   121
The Court observed that the application of the criminal law of 13 January 1995 to subsequent 
acts was not at issue in the instant case.  The applicant's criminal responsibility was 122
primarily a matter for the assessment of the domestic courts. However, it was the Court’s task 
to consider, from the standpoint of Article 7(1) of the Convention, whether the applicant's 
acts, at the time when they were committed, constituted offences defined with sufficient 
accessibility and foreseeability by the national law.   123
The Court found that tax evasion was also an offence prior to the new legislation coming into 
force, in particular in 1993 and 1994, when the applicant committed some of the acts of which 
he was accused. However, a prerequisite for a criminal conviction under the law in force at 
 Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2), para 20.118
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that time was that the person concerned had previously been found liable for a similar offence 
and subjected to an administrative penalty.  The applicant was not a subject of such a 124
penalty. The newer legislation maintained the requirement for a previous administrative 
penalty but added a condition concerning intent. The two conditions were alternative, not 
cumulative, thus making a person criminally liable if one of the conditions was satisfied. 
Thus, in finding the applicant guilty under that Article, the domestic courts held that the fact 
that no administrative penalty had previously been imposed on him was not a bar to his 
conviction.  The sentence imposed on the applicant – a suspended term of three years and 125
six months' imprisonment – took into account acts committed both before and after the newer 
legislation came into force.   126
The Court observed that, by definition, a “continuing offence” is a type of crime committed 
over a period of time.  According to the text of the relevant provision that was applicable to 127
the acts committed before their amendment in 1995, a person could be held criminally liable 
for tax evasion only if an administrative penalty had been imposed on him or her for a similar 
offence. The condition was thus an element of the offence of tax evasion without which a 
criminal conviction could not follow.  The decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by the 128
Government were handed down in April 1997 and January 1998, whereas the applicant’s 
complaint concerned the conviction based on acts committed during the period from 1993 to 
1994. In these circumstances, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court did not make the risk of 
criminal punishment foreseeable to the applicant.  The Court found that the domestic courts 129
applied the 1995 amendment to the law retrospectively to behaviour which did not previously 
constitute a criminal offence  in violation of Article 7(1) of the Convention. 130
2.3. Influence of Veeber v. Estonia (nо. 2) on Case Law of European Court of 
Human Rights 
There have not been many decisions in the case law of the ECtHR based on Article 7(1) since 
the judicial purge after the Second World War, and even fewer cases in which the act has been 
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criminalised between the time of commission and the time of adjudication.  Veeber v. 131
Estonia (no. 2) is the 17th in a line of 92 cases decided on the grounds of Article 7(1), the first 
dating back to 1961. It is also the 6th of the 18 cases published in Case Reports of the Court 
in that regard. This alone allows to presume this case to be at the very source of the Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning the interpretation of Article 7(1). 
For example, the ECtHR used the basic characteristics of the principle of legality and its 
aspect in form of legal certainty quoting Veeber in another prominent decision in the case 
Liivik v. Estonia.  In the HUDOC database this case is marked by importance level one, 132
which means that despite not being included in the Case Reports, it nevertheless made a 
significant contribution to the development, clarification or modification of the Court’s case 
law. 
The applicant, Mr Jaak Liivik, was appointed acting Director General of the Estonian 
Privatisation Agency and found guilty of misuse of his official position in connection with the 
privatisation proceedings.  The courts noted that the applicant had caused danger to the 133
preservation of the State’s assets  and had caused substantial moral damage to the authority 134
of the State within society and to the reputation of the Republic of Estonia as a contractual 
partner internationally.   135
The Court noted that relevant penal law provision and its interpretation were inherited from 
the former Soviet legal system. Thus, the domestic authorities were confronted with a difficult 
task of applying these legal norms and notions in the completely new context of a market 
economy.  The Court observed that the applicant was convicted of creating a situation in 136
which the preservation of the State’s assets might have been jeopardised and that this was 
considered significant damage despite the fact that the risks had not materialised.  The Court 137
found that the interpretation and application of a legal provision in the present case involved 
the use of such broad notions and such vague criteria in relevant national case law that the 
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criminal provision in question was not of the quality required under the Convention in terms 
of its clarity and the foreseeability of its effects.   138
In addition, the Court observed that the Public Prosecutor’s Office on several occasions 
expressed its opinion that the privatisation in question had been lawful and refused to initiate 
criminal proceedings against the applicant. The Public Prosecutor’s Office radically changed 
its position within the space of a few days without any substantial change in the 
circumstances. Even though the Public Prosecutor’s Office was not bound by its initial 
position, the radical change in the interpretation of the applicable law also demonstrates, in 
the circumstances, its insufficient clarity and foreseeability.  139
Liivik decision itself was later quoted as an authority in relation to the connection between 
Article 7 and principles of legality, foreseeability and accessibility in cases Khodorkovskiy 
and Lebedev v. Russia  and Alimucaj v. Albania.   140 141
There is also a case which factual basis is very similar to that of Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2) - 
Puhk v. Estonia.  The applicant was convicted for having failed adequately to organise 142
bookkeeping in his company during the period of its activity. However, criminal liability for 
an infringement of the relevant rules was established only during the last year of the activity 
of his company and did not cover the whole period of its operation.  In applying the 143
criminal law to the applicant’s behaviour before the date the applicable provision came into 
force, the domestic courts found that it was part of a continuing offence which lasted beyond 
that date.  The Court noted that the length of the period to which the law was applied 144
retrospectively is not decisive in considering whether or not the guarantees of Article 7 of the 
Convention have been respected.  The Court also pointed out that the jurisprudence referred 145
to by the Government related not to the period of the activity of his company, but to the years 
that followed after the relevant period had passed. It follows that in the absence of a law on 
criminal liability for inadequate organisation of accounting, the applicant could not foresee 
the risk of criminal punishment for his conduct during that period.  In these circumstances, 146
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the Court found that the domestic courts applied retrospectively the 1993 law to behaviour 
which previously did not constitute a criminal offence,  thus reaching an analogical decision 147
to the one in Veeber (no. 2). 
The principles described in Veeber (no. 2) were also used in the case of Rohlena v. the Czech 
Republic,  published in the Court’s Case Reports and decided by the Grand Chamber. The 148
applicant was formally indicted by the Brno municipal prosecutor for having, at least between 
2000 and 2006, repeatedly physically and mentally abused his wife while he was drunk. 
According to the prosecutor, the applicant had thus committed the “continuing” criminal 
offence of abusing a person living under the same roof within the meaning of relevant 
criminal provisions of the Czech Republic, given that his conduct prior to the introduction of 
that offence on 1 June 2004 had amounted to the offence of violence against an individual or 
group of individuals and assault occasioning bodily harm.  149
Despite taking into account other relevant case law of the ECtHR, the Court mostly based its 
substantial analysis on Veeber (no. 2). The Court examined whether, at the time they were 
committed, the applicant’s acts, including those carried out before the entry into force of a 
new legislation of 2004, constituted an offence defined with sufficient foreseeability  by 150
domestic law.  The Court used the same principles to establish the occurrence of continuing 151
or continuous criminal offence as in Veeber (no. 2) and found  that such an offence was a 152
type of crime committed over a period of time.  153
In analogy with Veeber (no. 2),  the Court observed that it was implicit from the Supreme 154
Court’s reasoning that the concept of a continuation of a criminal offence developed by the 
case law was introduced into the domestic criminal code prior to the first assault on his wife 
of which the applicant was convicted.  The Court concluded that all the constituent elements 155
of the offence were punishable under the old and the new law.  The Court found nothing to 156
indicate that the above-mentioned approach by the domestic courts had the adverse effect of 
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increasing the severity of the applicant’s punishment as analyzed in Veeber (no. 2).  On the 157
contrary, had the acts perpetrated by him prior to the coming into force of a new legislation in 
2004 have been assessed separately from those he committed after that date. In the event of an 
opposite nature, the applicant would have received at least the same sentence as the one 
actually imposed, or even a harsher one.  158
Veeber (no. 2) was also used in the dissenting opinion of judge Popović in the case of Achour 
v. France,  also published in the ECtHR Case Reports. The applicant was initially convicted 159
of drug trafficking in 1984 and that he finished serving his sentence in 1986. He was 
subsequently convicted (under new statutory rules that came into force in 1994) of further 
drug offences committed in the course of 1995  - the applicant was, in legal terms, a 160
recidivist.  The Court noted that new statutory rules provide that the maximum sentence and 161
fine that may be imposed are to be doubled in the event of recidivism and that the applicable 
period is no longer five years, as prescribed by the former legislation, but ten years from the 
expiry of the previous sentence or of the time allowed for its enforcement.   162
The Court decided that the applicant’s initial conviction of 1984 had not been expunged and 
remained in his criminal record. The domestic courts were therefore entitled to take it into 
account as the first component of recidivism. In this connection, the Court did not accept the 
applicant’s argument that the expiry of the relevant period for the purposes of recidivism, as 
provided at the time of his first offence, had afforded him the right to have his first offence 
disregarded, there being no provision for any such right in the applicable legislation.  The 163
Court further observed that there was long-established case law of the Court of Cassation on 
the question whether a new law extending the time that may elapse between the two 
components of recidivism can apply to a second offence committed after its entry into force. 
Such case law was manifestly capable of enabling the applicant to regulate his conduct.  164
The fact that the applicant’s previous criminal status was subsequently taken into account by 
the trial and appeal courts, a possibility resulting from the fact that his first conviction 
remained in his criminal record, was not found to be in breach of the provisions of Article 7. 
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The Court noted that the practice of taking past events into consideration should be 
distinguished from the notion of retrospective application of the law.  165
In his dissenting opinion judge Popović considered that Article 7(1) of the Convention was 
infringed. The Court has on a number of occasions  found violations of Article 7(1) of the 166
Convention in that the national courts had not applied the more lenient or favourable law as, 
for example, in Veeber (no. 2).  In his opinion, the Court endorsed the imposition of a 167
harsher penalty than would have been imposed if the role of precedents which he considered 
binding had not been ignored. This role entailed applying the general rule on settling conflicts 
between successive criminal statutes.  168
The Court also upheld legal principles given in Veeber (no. 2) in the case of Aras 
v. Turkey (no. 2). Тhe applicant, as the Director General of Yurtbank, had influenced the 
bank’s branch offices to collect deposits to be transferred to offshore accounts. It was pointed 
out that these deposits had been used to provide loans to companies which were owned by the 
bank’s main shareholder. The applicant was found guilty of aggravated fraud as charged under 
now repealed Criminal Code and sentenced to two years and eleven months’ imprisonment 
and a fine in respect of this offence. As the appeal proceedings were pending, the Court of 
Cassation decided that the sentence should be reassessed in the light of the new Criminal 
Code. Following a retrial, the domestic court sentenced the applicant to two years and one 
month’s imprisonment and a fine under new Criminal Code, indicating that this was the most 
favourable provision applicable to the case.   169
The Court reiterated that it follows from the principles found in Article 7 of the Convention 
that an offence must be clearly defined in the law. As in Veeber (no. 2)  the Court found this 170
requirement to be satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant 
provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, what acts and 
omissions will make him criminally liable.  The applicant, who was an executive board 171
member and Director General of Yurtbank, and who undoubtedly had the benefit of 
appropriate legal advice in the course of his duties, should have foreseen at the material time 
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that he ran a risk of prosecution for fraudulent granting of loans to companies belonging to the 
main shareholder of the bank. As a result, it could not be concluded that he was found guilty 
of an offence on account of an act which did not constitute a criminal offence under the 
national law.  In the light of the foregoing, the Court decided that this part of the application 172
was manifestly ill-founded.  173
There are two interesting and highly relevant decisions on admissibility involving Estonia. 
The cases concerned Article 7 of the Convention. It was examined whether the conviction of 
crimes against humanity was based on the retrospective application of criminal law.    
In Kolk and Kislõi (Kislyiy) v. Estonia both applicants participated in the deportation of the 
civilian population from the occupied Republic of Estonia to remote areas of the Soviet 
Union.  The Court noted that this deed was expressly recognised as a crime against 174
humanity in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1945.  The universal validity of the 175
principles concerning crimes against humanity was subsequently confirmed by, inter alia, 
resolution 95 of the United Nations General Assembly (11 December 1946) and later by the 
International Law Commission. The Court emphasised that it is expressly stated in Article I(b) 
of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity  that no statutory limitations shall apply to crimes against 176
humanity, irrespective of the date of their commission and whether committed in time of war 
or in time of peace. After accession to the above Convention, the Republic of Estonia became 
bound to implement the said principles. The Court noted that even if the acts committed by 
the applicants could have been regarded as lawful under the Soviet law at the material time, 
they were nevertheless found by the Estonian courts to constitute crimes against humanity 
under international law at the time of their commission. It was noteworthy in this context that 
the Soviet Union was a party to the relevant international agreements dating back to 1945 that 
affirmed the principles of international law recognised by the Charter. Consequently, it could 
not be claimed that these principles were unknown to the Soviet authorities. The Court thus 
considered groundless the applicants’ allegations that their acts had not constituted crimes 
 ECtHR 1895/05, 17.02.2009, Aras v. Turkey, para 58.172
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against humanity at the time of their commission and that they could not reasonably have 
been expected to be aware of that. The complaints were found to be manifestly ill-founded 
and were rejected.  177
The case Penart v. Estonia  has a somewhat similar factual matrix. On the 9th of April 2003 178
the applicant was convicted of crimes against humanity under the relevant national provision. 
According to the charges the applicant had in 1953-1954 served as the head of Elva 
Department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the 
summer of 1953 he had planned and directed the killing of a person hiding in the woods from 
the repressions of the occupation authorities.  The Court conducted an analysis analogical to 179
the one in Kolk and Kislõi (Kislyiy) v. Estonia and noted that even if the acts committed by the 
applicant could have been regarded as lawful under the Soviet law at the material time, they 
were nevertheless found by the Estonian courts to constitute crimes against humanity under 
international law at the time of their commission. Just as in Kolk and Kislõi (Kislyiy) v. 
Estonia no statutory limitation was found applicable to crimes against humanity, irrespective 
of the date of their commission. The complaint was also found to be manifestly ill-founded 
and rejected.  180
Despite not directly quoting Veeber (no. 2) but relevant domestic provisions based on the 
same principles, these two cases made a significant contribution to the clarification of the 
prohibition of the retrospective application of criminal law. The judgment in Kolk and Kislõi 
(Kislyiy) v. Estonia was also published in the Case Reports of the Court. Both Kolk and Kislõi 
(Kislyiy) and Penart were later used in similar decisions concerning countries with an 
analogical historical background to analyse whether the convictions of crimes were based on 
the retrospective application of criminal law. For example, in relation to a conviction for 
genocide during the Soviet occupation and under the USSR repressive structures in 
Lithuania  and convictions for war crimes,  crimes against humanity and genocide  181 182 183
committed in similar historical circumstances in Latvia. The case originating from Lithuania 
was also selected for the Case Reports for its influence on the case law of the Court.  
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To sum up, if one wanted to mention aspects in which Estonian cases have been particularly 
relevant for the application of Convention rights, Article 7(1) would one of them.  The 184
assessment of the Court in Liivik was mostly based on Veeber (no. 2). The Court also 
examined the particular circumstances of Puhk in the light of the application of the foregoing 
principles in Veeber (no. 2). In Penart and Kolk and Kislõi the Court took national provision 
prohibiting retrospective application of criminal law into consideration, not the explanation of 
the same principle in Veeber (no. 2). However, its analysis seriously contributed to the 
clarification of the interpretation of Article 7 and complemented one given in Veeber (no. 2) in 
relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity.        
It cannot be said that Veeber (no. 2) influenced only those decisions of the Court that were 
made against Estonia or former USSR countries. This is only confirmed by the fact that the 
approach of the Court in the case against the Czech Republic, Rohlena, was mainly based on 
Veeber (no. 2). In Aras the ECtHR upheld the principles as given in its previous case law thus 
showing their lasting relevance. 
2.4. Effect of Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2) on Case Law of  Supreme Court of 
Estonia 
Experience of Estonia, one of EU Member States, can be used as an example of an application 
of the principles found in the case law of the ECtHR in the domestic proceedings. And the 
Supreme Court of Estonia did not leave the decision of the ECtHR in Veeber (no. 2) 
unnoticed. It relied on these cases on four independent occasions,  in cases Nos 185
3-1-1-93-15,  3-1-1-40-14,  3-1-1-60-07  and 3-1-1-24-05.  This does not include the 186 187 188 189
domestic proceedings in relation to the applicant in Veeber (no. 2) himself - that issue is 
discussed in a separate subsection of this chapter.   
The decision of the Supreme Court in 3-1-1-93-15 is even more interesting, considering the 
Court relied on the analysis found both in Veeber and Liivik. This decision concerned three 
individuals charged with forgery of documents and the opening of another person’s email box 
 K. Merusk, M. Susi, p 340.184
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in order to get the information about the contents of the messages. Both of them were found 
guilty on all charges.  190
The Supreme Court of Estonia admitted that the wording of a relevant provision was not 
successful in terms of legal clarity. The concept of surveillance of the other person was 
ambiguous. There also was a certain inconsistency between the specifications of different 
provisions. However, for many years precedent to the commission of the acts, there had been 
a long-established case law of the Supreme Court that defined the concept of unauthorised 
surveillance of a person.  Thus, the principle of legality as given in Veeber (no. 2) quoting 191
other relevant decisions and Liivik, stressing the admissibility of judicial interpretation in the 
context of fulfilling the prerequisites of Article 7, allowed the Supreme Court to reach a 
conclusion that the accused could reasonably foresee the criminal consequences of their 
intended acts.   192
The conclusion reached by the ECtHR in Veeber was found to be relevant in another complex 
case tried at the Supreme Court of Estonia - No 3-1-1-60-07. The later part of a continuing act 
(tax offence) corresponded to the description of an act criminalized by the time of its 
commission. The Estonian court agreed to the ECtHR that it does not automatically mean that 
the remaining parts of an act submitted during the period of validity of the previous version of 
the Penal Code could also be considered a criminal offense.  However, on that particular 193
occasion, there were other provisions, left unnoticed by the prosecution, that criminalized the 
earlier part of a continuing act.  Veeber, thus, was distinguished on the facts. 194
In its ruling concerning passing the case 3-1-1-24-05 to the Great Chamber of the Supreme 
Court of Estonia, the Court once more upheld the principle  given in Veeber (no. 2) that the 195
requirements of clarity and foreseeability are satisfied where the individual can know about 
potential criminal liability from the wording of the relevant provision or from courts' 
interpretation of it. The Criminal Chamber expressed doubts that without earlier case law, it 
may not be possible to foresee with sufficient clarity that an abuse of an official position 
 Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2), para 1; ECtHR 12157/05, 25.06.2009, Liivik v. Estonia, para 16.190
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involving non-material damage is punishable as a criminal offense.  The accused was later 196
found not guilty on the grounds that his acts did not constitute the incriminated offence.  197
The decision in the case No 3-1-1-40-14 concerned a situation with a factual matrix less 
similar to Veeber (no. 2). However, the Supreme Court used this decision in order to show that 
the principle of legality presupposes the law was created by the legislative branch and 
published according to the relevant provisions of a state. The Supreme Court reached a 
conclusion that no legal basis for punishing a person could be created only by interpreting an 
EU directive and that independently of national legal norms.       198
The important role of case law was once more accentuated in relation to the decision in a case 
No 1-16-5792. In the applicant’s opinion, the relevant provisions of Penal Code were 
insufficiently clear when it came to legal definitions such as “act of sexual nature’’, “manner 
other than sexual intercourse’’ and “erotic situation’’.  The Supreme Court noted once more 199
that the formulation of a legal provision in a way that needs to be interpreted does not 
necessarily mean the provision is unconstitutional.  Its analysis was based on the same 200
principles as were given in Veeber, but quoting mostly Liivik, which was in turn based on the 
analysis provided in Veeber (no. 2). 
2.5. Reopening of Domestic Proceedings  
No case is terminated at the moment when judgment has been delivered - the question then 
arises whether the judgment will in fact be executed.  In this regard, declaratory relief has an 201
important role in preventing a violation that is threatened but has not yet caused measurable 
harm. Generally, however, a declaratory judgment will not be an adequate remedy.  To grant 202
redress for the damaged applicant is essential, and this is not always achieved even by the 
payment of a pecuniary sum for damages.  
The adoption of specific individual measures may be required to put an end to the illicit 
situation or to put the damaged in the situation it was before the violation of his rights took 
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place. This is particularly evident in cases where the procedural safeguards of the defendant 
have been violated but the applicant is continuing to serve the sentence.  In legal literature 203
the reopening of domestic proceedings was found to be a “necessary consequence”,  “the 204
most efficient approach”  and “an appropriate measure”.  It seems only logical that it was 205 206
endorsed by the Court in its recent case law. For example, in its Interim Resolution  on the 207
execution of the judgment Hulki Güneş v. Turkey,  the Court firmly recalled the obligation 208
of the Turkish authorities under Article 46(1) of the Convention to redress the violations 
found in respect of the applicant, and strongly urged them to promptly remove the 
legal lacuna preventing the reopening of domestic proceedings in the applicant's case.  
Furthermore, the reopening of domestic proceedings was made obligatory to the states by 
Recommendation R(2000)2 of 19 January 2000 of the Committee of Ministers.  This 209
recommendation suggests that re-examination or re-opening shall take place when the ECtHR 
finds a violation of European Convention on Human Rights and when an injured person by 
the national final judgment continues to suffer negative consequences which are not 
appropriately remedied by just satisfaction.  States all over Europe have amended and 210
improved their legal procedures to comply with the Court’s rulings.   211
However, whether the reopening of a case in the domestic legal order is a direct consequence 
of a judgment of the ECtHR and whether there is a duty of the states to reopen cases, in 
particular, criminal procedures, had been a disputed question for a long time.   212
This issue became pressing for Estonia because of the ECtHR judgments Puhk and Veeber 
(no. 2). In both cases the retroactive application of criminal law to the applicant's 
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disadvantage called for the reopening of proceedings and for a reversal of the conviction.  213
The Supreme Court of Estonia noted that there were no legal provisions that would allow the 
reopening of proceedings after and because of a judgment of the ECtHR at the time.  214
However, the national judicial system was to guarantee the rights established by the 
Convention.  The Supreme Court suggested an amendment to the procedural laws in order 215
to solve this problem,  but in order to fulfill its international obligations reopened the 216
proceedings. The Supreme Court noted that reopening was only justified because there was no 
other remedy available, a continuing and considerable violation of the individual's rights was 
taking place and, as a result of the reopening, the legal status of the person could be 
improved.  Both Puhk and Veeber were acquitted of the charges.  It is noteworthy that the 217 218
procedural laws were, indeed, later amended and now comprise a legal provision that allows 
for the reopening of the proceedings.  What is, perhaps, even more important, is the fact that 219
decision of the Supreme Court of Estonia concerning the reopening of the proceedings after 
Veeber, No 3-1-3-13-03, has opened a way for the Supreme Court to rely directly on the 
decisions of the ECtHR, without the principles of those judgments being introduced into the 
national legislation in form of legal provisions. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Estonia is different when it comes to another case  220
that also concerned reopening of proceedings after a decision of the ECtHR, this time, 
however, in Liivik. This case had a slightly different factual basis. The conviction was also 
based on the retroactive application of criminal law to the applicant's disadvantage but 
expired by the time the person applied for the reopening of proceedings.   221
This approach, taken by the Estonian Supreme Court, shows the realization of an obligation to 
reopen domestic proceedings, in particular, the Estonian approach to its implementation. It 
also exposes a possible influence of the Court’s judgment on a Member State. It could inspire 
other EU countries to join this example and give the national courts courage to ask for a 
change of the domestic legal provisions to allow it. It seems, however, to be more probable 
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that an EU member state would change its legal norms not because of the behaviour of the 
Estonian courts and the Parliament, but after a direct decision in relation to that particular 
state. This happened in Romania, for instance, as a consequence of the Court’s decision in the 
case Maria Atanasiu and others v. Romania.   222
 ECtHR 30767/05, 33800/06, 12.10.2010, Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania.222
"31
3. Tammer v. Estonia 
3.1. General principles concerning freedom of expression 
3.1.1. Role of freedom of expression 
In the context of effective political democracy and respect for human rights mentioned in the 
Preamble to the Convention, freedom of expression is not only important in its own right, but 
also plays a central part in the protection of other rights under the Convention.  It constitutes 223
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for the development of every man.   224
In relation to the press the Court has created a concept of the Public Watchdog with the 
emphasis on its vital role in democratic society that is analogous to the guardianship of the 
public interest. Article 10 was intended to broaden the terms of political debate.   225
The role of the press as political watchdog was first mentioned by the Court in the Lingens 
case.  In newspaper articles the journalist had criticised the then Austrian Federal Chancellor 226
for announcing a coalition with a party led by a person with a Nazi background. The journalist 
(Mr Lingens) had referred to the Chancellor’s behaviour as “immoral”, “undignified”, 
demonstrating “the lowest opportunism”.  Following a private prosecution brought by the 227
Chancellor, the Austrian courts found these statements to be defamatory and imposed a fine 
on the journalist.  The Court argued that freedom of the press affords the public one of the 228
best means of forming an opinion about the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. More 
generally, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic 
society.  In Jersild  and Thoma  the Court reiterated that punishment of a journalist for 229 230 231
assisting in the dissemination made by another person would seriously hamper the 
contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not be 
envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so.  
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3.1.2. Object of Protection 
The “expression” protected under Article 10 is not limited to words, written or spoken, but it 
extends to pictures,  images and actions intended to express an idea or to present 232
information.   233
Moreover, Article 10 protects not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, 
but also the form in which they are conveyed.  It follows that the means for the production 234
and communication, transmission or distribution of information and ideas are covered by 
Article 10, and the Court must be aware of the rapid developments of such means in many 
areas.  235
Article 10(2) is applicable not only to “information”  or “ideas” that are favourably received 
or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society”.  In this 236
connection, the Court reiterated that journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a 
degree of exaggeration or even provocation.  In the Court’s opinion sufficient consideration 237
must be given to the context in which the impugned statement was made, the style used,  238
and the aim of the criticism. In matters of public controversy or public interest, during 
political debate, in electoral campaigns or where the criticism is levelled at government, 
politicians or public authorities, strong words and harsh criticism may be expected and will be 
tolerated to a greater degree by the Court.  For example, in Thorgeirson phrases such as 239
“beasts in uniform”, “individuals reduced to a mental age of a newborn child”, “bullying, 
forgery, unlawful actions, superstitions, rashness and ineptitude” were not regarded as 
excessive by the Court, having in view the aim of urging reform of police.   240
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3.1.3. “Duties and Responsibilities” 
The idea according to which the exercise of freedom of expression carries with it duties and 
responsibilities is unique in the Convention, and it cannot be found in any of the other 
provisions regulating rights and freedoms.  This text, however, is not to be interpreted as 241
automatically limiting the freedom of expression of individuals belonging to certain 
professional categories.  At the same time, the notion of “duties and responsibilities” has 242
been invoked in relation to different bearers of expression rights, including politicians, civil 
servants, lawyers, the press, journalists, editors, authors and publishers, novelists. This notion 
assumes marked importance with respect to special categories of civil servants, such as 
diplomats, judges, intelligence agents and police officers.  The scope of the “duties and 243
responsibilities” depends on the situation and the technical means used, which means that an 
individual in his private capacity has no such obligations.  244
The need to exercise the freedom with regard to “duties and responsibilities” also applies to 
the press. These “duties and responsibilities” are liable to assume significance when there is 
question of attacking the reputation of private individuals and undermining the “rights of 
others”.  The safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation to reporting on issues 245
of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith in order to 
provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism.  246
These considerations play a particularly important role nowadays, given the influence wielded 
by the media in contemporary society: not only do they inform, they can also suggest by the 
way in which they present the information how it is to be assessed. In a world in which the 
individual is confronted with vast quantities of information circulated via traditional and 
electronic media and involving an ever-growing number of players, monitoring compliance 
with journalistic ethics takes on added importance.  247
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3.1.4. Three Stage Test 
Freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR is not unlimited. It is true, that this 
freedom amounts to a principal right, necessary for a dignified human existence and therefore 
should receive, in some sense, absolute protection.  But this view should not be 248
misunderstood as permitting all types of expressions, for example the publication of child 
pornography, in principle.  That is but one of many reasons for Article 10(2) to specify the 249
conditions upon which States may restrict freedom of expression.  The Court has to examine 250
whether the interference was “prescribed by law”, whether it had an aim or aims that is or are 
legitimate under Article 10(2) and whether it was “necessary in a democratic society” for the 
aforesaid aim or aims. 
The restriction clauses contained in the second paragraph are themselves quite broad. In order 
to prevent the abuse of power inherent in this breadth, the Court has established rules of strict 
interpretation for these clauses.  Strict interpretation means that no other criteria than those 251
mentioned in the exception clause itself may be at the basis of any restrictions, and these 
criteria, in turn, must be understood in such a way that the language is not extended beyond 
its ordinary meaning.  Basically, the Court established a legal standard that in any borderline 252
case, the freedom of the individual must be favourably weighted against the State’s claim of 
overriding interest.  253
According to the first requirement, any interference with the exercise of freedom of 
expression must have a basis in the national law. As a rule, this would mean a written and 
public law adopted by the Parliament,  however, the Court has established in its case law 254
that both common-law  and public international law  rules satisfy this requirement. It also 255 256
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encompasses the rules enacted by different administrative or professional bodies to which the 
law-making and disciplinary authorities are delegated.  257
In the Court’s opinion, there are two additional requirements that flow from the expression 
“prescribed by law”. Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to 
have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given 
case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he or she must be able - if need be with 
appropriate advice  - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 258
consequences which a given action may entail.  Whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may 259
cause excessive rigidity. The law, however, must be able to keep pace with changing 
circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or 
lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice.  260
Even in areas affecting national security or fighting organised crime where the foreseeable 
character of the law can be weaker, the wording of the law must be nevertheless sufficiently 
clear. It should give individuals an adequate indication of the legal conduct and the 
consequences of acting unlawfully.   261
Once a measure is found to breach the legal basis test, the examination should terminate. Yet, 
in the case the question relating to the sub-test of foreseeability remains inconclusive, the 
Court may focus on examining the compatibility with the standard “necessary in a democratic 
society”.   262
The second paragraph of Article 10 lists nine legitimate purposes for which restrictions of the 
freedom of expression can be justified.  The list of the possible grounds for restricting the 263
freedom of expression is exhaustive. Domestic authorities may not legitimately rely on any 
other ground falling outside the list provided for in paragraph 2.  The ECtHR usually 264
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accepts a State’s assessment of the legitimate aim, reserving more detailed scrutiny for other 
aspects of Article 10(2).   265
When there is a legitimate aim behind an interference with freedom of expression, the third 
requirement of paragraph 2 comes into play - proportionality. It must be decided whether an 
interference is “necessary in a democratic society”.  According to the Court’s case law, the 266
adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10(2), implies the existence of a 
"pressing social need”.  Proportionality has a number of elements: whether the measure is 267
appropriate to achieve its stated aim; and whether no other, less intrusive effective measure is 
available.  The Court must also determine whether the interference at issue was 268
“proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.  The ECtHR has not always been consistent 269
in how it sees proportionality  and different factual circumstances might mean a different 270
outcome, even with the application of the same test.  271
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State 
authorities are found (by the Court) to be in a better position than the international judge to 
give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the “necessity” of a 
“restriction” or “penalty”.  This approach is called “margin of appreciation”. Furthermore, 272
where two or more Convention rights are in direct conflict in this way, Member States will 
have a particularly wide margin of appreciation to determine the balance between them.  It 273
goes, however, hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law and the 
decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts. The Court is therefore 
empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of 
expression as protected by Article 10.  In sum, the Court’s task in exercising its supervision 274
is not to take the place of national authorities but rather to review under Article 10, in the light 
of the case as a whole, the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of 
appreciation.  275
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3.2. Judgment of European Court of Human Rights in Tammer v. Estonia 
As it was mentioned before, the second paragraph of Article 10 lists nine legitimate purposes 
for the restrictions of the freedom of expression. One of them, “the protection of… rights of 
others”, has been frequently invoked to ascertain the degree to which the privacy or reputation 
and honour of public figures can be guaranteed.  On several occasions the Court has 276
observed that not only private individuals, but also public persons have a legitimate 
expectation of protection of and respect for their private life.  Just as the ECtHR has 277
protected the ability of individuals to control the use of their images, voice and personal data, 
it also has upheld laws that protect the ways in which individuals are presented to the general 
public in the press. Tammer v. Estonia provides an excellent example of this principle in 
action  and has remained one of the best-known cases emerging from Estonia and is often 278
referred to in textbooks and manuals dealing with the case law of the Strasbourg court.  279
The applicant was convicted on the basis of the remarks he had made in his capacity as a 
journalist in a newspaper interview on publication of a well-known politician's wife, Ms 
Laanaru, personal memoirs.  The applicant used words such as “rongaema” and 280
“abielulõhkuja”.  These words cannot be translated into English precisely, but stand for 281
someone who deliberately breaks up another person’s marriage and who is a negligent parent 
to her child.  The Court observed that Ms Laanaru resigned from her governmental position, 282
but remained involved in the political party.   283
The Court noted that the case involved a conflict between the right to impart ideas and the 
reputation and rights of others.  It was found that the burden was “prescribed by law” in a 284
relevant provision of penal code, and that the law in question furthered a legitimate 
government purpose, namely, protection of personal honor and reputation.  285
 D. Harris, M. O'Boyle, E. Bates, C. Buckley, p 480.276
 D. Voorhoof. Freedom of Expression under the European Human Rights System. From Sunday Times (No. 1) 277
v. U.K. (1979) to Hachette Filipacchi Associes (Ici Paris) v. France (2009). - Inter-American and European 
Human Rights Journal, Vol 2, 2009, p 22.
 R. Krotoszynski. Reconciling Privacy and Speech in the Era of Big Data: A Comparative Legal Analysis. - 278
William and Mary Law Review, Vol 56, Issue 4, 2015, p 1309.
 K. Merusk, M. Susi, p 335.279
 Tammer v. Estonia, para 64.280
 Tammer v. Estonia, para 67.281
 K. Merusk, M. Susi, p 337.282
 Tammer v. Estonia, para 68.283
 Tammer v. Estonia, para 69.284
 R. Krotoszynski, p 1311.285
"38
The Court used proportionality analysis to determine whether applicant’s conviction and 
sentence were not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that the reasons 
advanced by the domestic courts were sufficient and relevant to justify such interference. The 
Court did not find it established that the use of the impugned terms in relation to Ms 
Laanaru’s private life was justified by considerations of public concern or that they bore on a 
matter of general importance.  It considered that the applicant could have formulated his 286
criticism of Ms Laanaru’s actions without resorting to such insulting expressions.  The 287
Court also noted the limited amount of the fine imposed on the applicant as a sanction  and 288
reached a conclusion that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression 
could reasonably be considered necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the Convention.   289
Thus, the Court showed that freedom of the press does not extend to idle gossip about 
intimate or extra-marital relations merely serving to satisfy the curiosity of a certain 
readership.  A newspaper is not free to use harsh words to characterize a person if it does not 290
relate to his or her official duties. Nor does a person being active in politics make his or her 
private life automatically a matter of public concern. Essentially, the ECtHR held that even a 
person on an important government positions, and active in politics, has a right to demand 
privacy with respect to his or her personal life.  In addition to this, the decisive factor in 291
balancing the protection of private life against freedom of expression should lie in the 
contribution that the published photographs and articles made to a debate of general 
interest.  The Court has also made clear that once politicians or civil servants withdraw from 292
their political or civic life, they regain the status of private persons entitled to a broader scope 
of privacy rights.   293
There will usually be a wide margin accorded if the State is required to strike a balance 
between competing private and public interests or Convention rights.  On the other hand, it 294
might be more likely that interference with Article 8 is considered disproportionate if 
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comment on matters not in the public interest is protected, where the countervailing Article 10 
interest is likely to have less weight.  295
3.3. Influence of Tammer v. Estonia (no. 2) on Case Law of European Court 
of Human Rights 
The Court has since quoted Tammer on many occasions. Most of the times the Court 
reminded that under Article 10 of the Convention, the Contracting States have a certain 
margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity and scope of any interference in the freedom 
of expression protected by that Article, in particular when a balance has to be struck between 
conflicting private interests.  This principle was not developed in Tammer, but was quoted 296
there in order to remind of its lasting relevance.  
The same is true in relation towards another principle upheld in many cases, not starting, but 
including and quoting Tammer. The Court reiterated that the nature and severity of the penalty 
imposed are factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of the 
interference.  297
Tammer is also quoted among the other authorities when it comes to recognition of the 
impossibility of attaining absolute precision in the framing of laws, especially in fields in 
which the situation changes according to the prevailing views of society. That was found to be 
especially true in the field of the freedom of speech  and its enjoyment by the press. Two 298
other cases are of a much bigger importance and relevance when it comes to analysing the 
influence of Tammer on the case law of the ECtHR and thus EU law in that regard. The first 
one is Von Hannover v. Germany.   299
The case concerned the photos of the applicant, the princess Caroline von Hannover, that 
showed her in scenes from her daily life, involving activities of a purely private nature such as 
engaging in sport, out walking, leaving a restaurant or on holiday. The photos illustrated a 
series of articles with such innocuous titles as “Pure happiness”, “Out and about with Princess 
Caroline in Paris” and “The kiss. Or: they are not hiding anymore”.  Both Tammer and 300
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Hannover thus dealt with the private lives of individuals who did not exercise official 
functions but were nevertheless “public figures”. The Court used the same line of reasoning 
and general principles as in Tammer  when it reached a conclusion that merely classifying a 301
person as a celebrity does not suffice to justify such an intrusion into his or her private life.  302
Both in Tammer and Von Hannover the Court considered that the public does not have a 
legitimate interest in finding out general details of private lives of people being well known to 
the public.  From now on, courts should engage in an analysis of the nature of the 303
publication and its general importance  and some form of public interest will be necessary to 304
justify invasions into the privacy.  The courts should also look into the value of the speech 305
concerned and decide on it protection accordingly to the contribution it makes to an open 
debate on matters of general importance.   306
However, even a slight change in the factual matrix of the case can overturn the Court’s 
decision as it happened in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2). Photos of Princess Caroline von 
Hannover and Prince Ernst August von Hannover during a skiing holiday were placed next to 
the articles about the illness affecting Prince Rainier III, the reigning sovereign of the 
Principality of Monaco at the time, and the conduct of the members of his family during that 
illness.  The Court reiterated that its task is to determine whether the manner in which 307
national authorities concluded balancing of the rights of the publishing companies to freedom 
of expression against the right of the applicants to respect for their private life.  The Court 308
observed that the national courts attached fundamental importance to the question whether the 
photos, considered in the light of the accompanying articles, had contributed to a debate of 
general interest. They also examined the circumstances in which the photos had been taken  309
which constitutes one of the factors that are normally examined when the competing interests 
are balanced against each other.  The Court accepted that the photos in question, considered 310
in the light of the accompanying articles, did contribute, at least to some degree, to a debate of 
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general interest.  There was nothing to indicate that the photos had been taken 311
surreptitiously or by equivalent secret means such as to render their publication illegal under 
the case law of the German courts.  This decision has been presented in the media as a step 312
forward for the freedom of speech over Article 8 privacy rights. That would seem to overstate 
the results.  The factual balance between what is found to be an intrusive depiction of a 313
celebrity figure and a realization of right to impart information is a fine one.  In von 314
Hannover (no. 2) it was emphasized that although in certain special circumstances the 
public’s right to be informed can even extend to aspects of the private life of public figures, 
particularly where politicians are concerned, this will not be the case - despite the person 
concerned being well known to the public - where the published photos and accompanying 
commentaries relate exclusively to details of a person’s private life and have the sole aim of 
satisfying public curiosity in that respect.  In his concurring opinion judge Cabral Barreto 315
expressed an idea that being at an open place frequented by the general public and, moreover, 
visible from the neighbouring buildings, excludes a reasonable expectation of not being 
exposed to public view or to the media.  However, allowing this approach to become 316
dominant in relation to privacy of public figures could result in an uncontrollable hunt by the 
media. Every time a public person leaves home or private premises, he or she embarks on the 
same routes as are “frequented by the general public” without any expectation of privacy left. 
This does not seem to be consistent with the general inclination of the Court to protect public 
people from continual harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense 
of intrusion into their private life or even of persecution.  317
Both Von Hannover v. Germany and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) have since been quoted 
and used in the Court’s reasoning on multiple occasions.  They have also become a part of 318
the Court’s case law of the highest level of importance by being published in the Court’s 
official Reports of Judgments and Decisions.  
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The principles of both Tammer and Von Hannover were later used in another important 
judgment  of the ECtHR - in the case of Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland. The applicant 319
company published in its newspaper some articles on a criminal trial concerning the drunken 
and disorderly behaviour, including an assault on a police officer, of Mr A. He was convicted 
and sentenced to six months’ suspended imprisonment. It was reported and mentioned in the 
headlines of those articles that the defendant was the husband of Mrs A., a member of the 
Finnish parliament and the chairperson of its Committee for Education and Culture.  The 320
trial of Mr A. had been widely publicised and discussed locally, and the role of Mrs A. – who 
was in no way involved in the criminal proceedings – had become the subject of, inter alia, 
political satire in a television programme.  Mrs A., who did not dispute the facts as 321
presented by Iltalehti, instituted proceedings against the applicant company and its editor-in-
chief, Mr Karhuvaara.  Domestic court convicted the first applicant and the two other 322
journalists on one count of invasion of privacy. In addition, all the defendants, including both 
applicants, were ordered to pay damages as requested by the plaintiff.   323
The defendants argued that they had only mentioned in their articles that Mrs A. was married 
to Mr A. Moreover, the case had already been reported locally and their article contained no 
new information as such. They also argued that a member of parliament, as a public political 
figure, must tolerate more from the media than an “average citizen” and that it was 
particularly disturbing that a member of parliament was trying to limit the applicants’ freedom 
of expression.  324
The District Court found that protection of the private life of Mrs A., as a member of 
parliament, was narrower than that of other persons, but only in so far as the matters in 
question were connected to her public functions and there was a public interest justifying their 
publication. The fact that the conviction of the spouse of a politician could affect people’s 
voting intentions did not in itself render the matter of public interest such as to justify the 
publication and the infringement of the plaintiff’s protected private domain.  The fines 325
imposed on the applicants were severe - EUR 37 365 in total.  326
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The Court noted that dispute in this case related to the question whether the interference was 
“necessary in a democratic society”  without any allegation of factual misrepresentation or 327
bad faith on the part of the applicants.  There was no allegation of the applicants having 328
exceeded the bounds of journalistic freedom. The Court further distinguished Karhuvaara 
from Tammer by observing that no statements had been made against Mrs A., nor had the 
article revealed any details of her private life, save for the fact that she was married to the 
defendant in the reported proceedings.  However, the Court noted that public has the right to 329
be informed, which is an essential right in a democratic society that, in certain special 
circumstances, may even extend to aspects of the private life of public figures, particularly 
where politicians are concerned  thus quoting Von Hannover judgment.  In this 330 331
connection, the Court also noted that the conviction of the spouse of a politician could affect 
people’s voting intentions. In the Court’s opinion this indicates that, at least to some degree, a 
matter of public interest was involved in the reporting.  Despite that, the Court considered 332
that severe penalties, viewed against the background of a limited interference with the private 
life of Mrs A., disclosed a striking disproportion between the competing interests of 
protection of private life and freedom of expression - the domestic courts failed to strike a fair 
balance between them.  333
As could be seen from this chapter, Tammer was used by the ECtHR on multiple occasions. 
Some of the previous principles developed in the Court’s case law were quoted with reference 
to Tammer as a recent authority. That includes, for example, the doctrine of state discretion. 
However, considering such prominent judgment as von Hannover and Karhuvaara, partially 
inspired by Tammer and continuing the same line of reasoning, it is clear that Tammer has 
served as a good source of inspiration in cases concerning different EU Member States. The 
factual basis of Tammer is universal enough not to be bound to Estonia only. It is also proven 
by the fact that the general principle derived from Tammer was also used in the opinion of the 
advocate general Kokott.  In addition to this, press continues to fulfil its function of a public 334
watchdog, enjoying even bigger influence and reach as a part of contemporary media culture. 
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It has become even more important to draw a line between freedom of expression and 
protection of a private life. This allows one to presume the influence of Tammer will not 
decrease in near future, but is much more likely to grow.  
"45
4. Delfi AS v. Estonia 
4.1. Judgment of European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v. Estonia 
The right to a private life is also essential when it comes to emerging new technologies.  In 335
a recent Delfi judgment it was analyzed whether an Estonian news site could be held liable for 
the anonymous defamatory comments posted online from its readers and removed upon 
request. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found that Estonia did not violate article 10 of the 
ECHR that guarantees the freedom of speech when held Delfi liable for the abovementioned 
comments.  336
The Court noted that user-generated expressive activity on the Internet provides an 
unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression. However, alongside these 
benefits, certain dangers may also arise.  Adjustments may be required to respond to new 337
challenges,  because in a digital environment every expression has immediate and extensive 338
influence. When it comes to opposing disclosure of defamatory comments, the victim has 
narrow options.  Defamatory and other types of clearly unlawful speech, including hate 339
speech and speech inciting violence, can be disseminated like never before, worldwide, in a 
matter of seconds,  and have no time limits.  This implies a commensurate level of 340 341
responsibility.  The rights under Article 10 and 8 of the ECHR deserve equal respect. 342
Important benefits can be derived from the Internet in the exercise of freedom of expression. 
However, liability for defamatory or other types of unlawful speech must, in principle, be 
retained and constitute an effective remedy for violations of personality rights.   343
The Grand Chamber found following aspects to be relevant for its analysis: the context of the 
comments, the measures applied by the applicant company in order to prevent or remove 
defamatory comments, the liability of the actual authors of the comments as an alternative to 
the applicant company’s liability, and the consequences of the domestic proceedings for the 
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applicant company.  The Court also agreed with the Chamber’s finding that the applicant 344
company must be considered to have exercised a substantial degree of control over the 
comments published on its portal.  Moreover, The Grand Chamber used the same criteria as 345
the chamber:  the majority of the impugned comments amounted to hate speech or 346
incitements to violence and as such did not enjoy the protection of Article 10;  the 347
comments were posted in reaction to an article published by the applicant company on its 
professionally managed news portal run on a commercial basis;  Delfi was one of the 348
biggest Internet media publications in the country;  it invited its readers to comment on the 349
articles  in order to profit from advertising revenue the more comments were posted; a 350
possibility to effectively bring a claim against the authors of the comments was not certain;  351
measures taken by Delfi to remove the comments were insufficient  and slow;  352 353
compensation of 320€, also taking into account the fact that the applicant company was a 
professional operator of one of the largest Internet news portals in Estonia, was not found 
disproportionate.  354
The Grand Chamber concluded that the relevant provisions along with the case-law made it 
foreseeable that a media publisher running an Internet news portal for an economic purpose 
could, in principle, be held liable under domestic law for the uploading of clearly unlawful 
comments, of the type at issue in the present case, on its news portal.  Thus, the Court 355
considered that the applicant company was in a position to assess the risks related to its 
activities and that it must have been able to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the consequences 
which these could entail. It therefore concluded that the interference in issue was “prescribed 
by law” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention.  Delfi 356
could not rely on the national implementation of the E-Commerce Directive  and its liability 357
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exemptions for Internet intermediaries  considering its economic interest in the 358
publication.  The Grand Chamber agreed that the restriction of the Delfi’s freedom of 359
expression had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others.   360
Some critics considered the approach of the ECtHR to be ignorant towards the case-law of the 
CJEU.  However, the author of the thesis at hand does not believe that to be the case. The 361
ECtHR cannot be found to have neglected the intermediary liability provisions and the 
relevant case-law. The ECtHR has considered at least six judgments of the CJEU: joined cases 
C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France and Google,  case C-324/09 L’Oréal and Others,  362 363
case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended,  case C-360/10 SABAM,  case C-131/12 Google Spain and 364 365
Google,  case C-291/13 Papasavvas.  The E-Commerce Directive provides a graduated 366 367
scale of protection, with the greatest protection going to services that are the most 
technical. However, there have been questions about the interpretation of some of the phrases 
in Article 14(2) of the Directive and the extent of the protection in Article 15.  The ECtHR 368
has not left these problems unnoticed which resulted in the positions of both courts reflecting 
each other. For example, similar conclusions that a filter might not be able to distinguish 
between lawful and illegal content, thus affecting users’ freedom of expression (access to 
information) were reached in cases SABAM v Netlog and Yildirim.  Both courts seem to 369
think that those acting in the course of their business are in a better place to assess where and 
when problems might arise. However, their point of view differs when it comes to commercial 
activities. The CJEU argued in Google Adwords  that the referencing service is subject to 370
 Directive on electronic commerce, articles 12-15.358
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payment, and Google sets the payment terms or provides general information to its clients. 
This cannot have the effect of depriving Google of the exemptions from liability provided in 
Directive 2000/31.  Both courts point to the idea about control over information. There are 371
differences, however, in that the control over the defamatory material in Papasavvas was 
much more direct than in Delfi, and the predictive abilities of newspapers about their 
audience’s response to stories not in issue.    372
Delfi is no contradiction to the E-Commerce Directive’s safe harbours. It simply says that the 
existence of these safe harbours is not indispensable from the human rights perspective.  373
The ECtHR upheld the decision of the domestic courts not to apply domestic norms 
transposing the E-Commerce Directive, since the latter related to activities of a merely 
technical, automatic and passive nature, unlike the applicant company’s activities, and that the 
objective pursued by the applicant company was not merely the provision of an intermediary 
service.  The Court took into account the possibility left for some countries to choose the 374
“differentiated and graduated approach” to the regulation of new media as recommended by 
the Council of Europe, which also found support in the Court’s case-law. The Court noted that 
although various approaches are possible in legislation to take account of the nature of new 
media, the Court was satisfied on the facts of Delfi that the relevant provisions and case law 
made it foreseeable that a media publisher running an Internet news portal for an economic 
purpose could, in principle, be held liable under domestic law for the uploading of clearly 
unlawful comments, of the type at issue in the present case, on its news portal.  However, it 375
should be remembered that even after the ECtHR judgment there is a chance that Estonia is 
found liable for breach of its international obligations,  this time, however, for not properly 376
transposing (giving effect to) the E-Commerce Directive.  The question remains if the CJEU 377
would accept the arguments of the ECtHR in Delfi, especially given its reasoning 
in L’Oreal regarding the ‘promotion’ of particular content and the requirements of a diligent 
economic operator.   378
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4.2. Impact of Delfi AS v. Estonia on case law of European Court of Human 
Rights and European Court of Justice 
The ECtHR has quoted Delfi on many occasions in order to uphold principles well established 
in the Court’s case law. These include the requirement of precision and foreseeability of legal 
provisions;  the need to balance freedom of expression and protection of private life;  to 379 380
separate legal properties of traditional print and audiovisual media v. Internet-based media;  381
to note the significant role played by the Internet in enhancing the public’s access to news and 
facilitating the dissemination of information  and to emphasize that safeguards afforded to 382
the press are of particular importance to the society.  383
For example, in Selmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the case 
concerned the forcible removal of journalists from the national Parliament gallery where they 
were reporting on a parliamentary session about approval of the State budget for 2013.  384
During the debate a group of opposition parties’ members of parliament (MPs). MPs had 
started creating a disturbance in the parliamentary chamber, and had been ejected by security 
officers.  The applicants, accredited journalists, had refused to leave the gallery, a 385
designated area for journalists, and ended up being forcibly removed by security.  They 386
brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court to complain about the incident, and 
contest the fact that there was no oral hearing before this court for them to challenge the facts 
as disputed between the parties.  The Court quoted the general principles concerning the 387
necessity of an interference with freedom of expression as summarised in the Delfi and, after 
applying those principles, established that there was no pressing social need to remove the 
applicants from the Parliament gallery.  In particular, there was no indication of any danger 388
deriving from the protests which had taken place outside the Parliament building on the day 
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of the incident, from the applicants themselves (who had neither contributed to nor 
participated in the disturbance in the chamber) or from the MPs who had been at the origin of 
the disorder.  Nor was the Court convinced that the applicants had effectively been able to 389
view the ongoing removal of the MPs, a matter which had been of legitimate public 
concern.  This shows that Delfi is an authority not only in the cases related to the Internet 390
defamation, but is also a source of summarised general principles concerning the necessity of 
an interference with freedom of expression. 
However, in a case that factual basis was the closest to the one of Delfi, the Court reached an 
opposite conclusion as compared to Delfi itself. Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and 
Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary and Delfi were distinguished on the facts. Оne applicant was a self-
regulatory body of internet content providers and the other was the owner of an Internet news 
portal. Both applicants allowed users to comment on publications appearing on their portals. 
Comments could be uploaded following registration and were not edited or moderated by the 
applicants before publication. The applicants’ portals contained disclaimers stating that the 
comments did not reflect the applicants’ own opinion , and a notice-and-take-down system, 391
which allowed readers to request the deletion of comments that caused concern.  392
In February 2010 the first applicant published an opinion about two real-estate management 
websites the full text of which was subsequently also published on the second applicant’s 
portal. The opinion attracted user comments some of which criticised the real-estate websites 
in derogatory terms. As a result, the company operating the websites brought a civil action 
against the applicants alleging damage to its reputation. The applicants immediately removed 
the offending user comments. They were nevertheless found by the domestic courts to bear 
objective liability for their publication, and ordered to pay procedural fees.  
The Court considered that the interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of 
expression was “prescribed by law”, foreseeable and had legitimate aim in the light of 
paragraph 2 of Article 10. However, the Court noted that Hungarian courts did not assess how 
the application of civil liability to a news portal operator will affect freedom of expression on 
the Internet. When allocating liability in the case, those courts did not perform any balancing 
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at all between competing interests.  The Court noted that the domestic authorities accepted 393
without any further analysis or justification that the impugned statements were unlawful as 
being injurious to the reputation of the plaintiff’s company.  Due to these reasons the Court 394
itself assessed the relevant criteria as laid down in Delfi to the extent that the domestic 
authorities failed to do so,  but reached an opposite conclusion as compared to Delfi.  395
The main difference between two cases was that offensive and vulgar comments did not 
constitute clearly unlawful speech; and they certainly did not amount to hate speech or 
incitement to violence.  The domestic courts imposed objective liability on the applicants 396
for “having provided space for injurious and degrading comments” and did not perform any 
examination of the conduct of either the applicants or the plaintiff when it came to the 
removal of such comments.  Furthermore, while the second applicant is the owner of a large 397
media outlet which must be regarded as having economic interests, the first applicant is a non-
profit self-regulatory association of Internet service providers, with no known such 
interests.  398
Another important difference between Delfi and Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete is 
that the second judgment considered the defamation of a legal, not a private, person. The 
Court found a difference between the commercial reputational interests of a company and the 
reputation of an individual concerning his or her social status.  As in Delfi, the Court 399
decided that if accompanied by effective procedures allowing for rapid response, the notice-
and-take-down-system could function in many cases as an appropriate tool for balancing the 
rights and interests of all those involved. On the other hand, in cases where third-party user 
comments take the form of hate speech and direct threats to the physical integrity of 
individuals, the rights and interests of others and of the society as a whole might entitle 
Contracting States to impose liability on Internet news portals if they failed to take measures 
to remove clearly unlawful comments without delay, even without notice from the alleged 
victim or from third parties. However, Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete did not 
involve such utterances.  Together with Delfi this case helped to further developed 400
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principles that help to ascertain the liability of Internet news portals. For example, one of 
these rules states that the outcome of the balancing exercise will be acceptable in so far as 
courts applied the appropriate criteria and, moreover, weighed the relative importance of each 
criterion with due respect paid to the particular circumstances of the case.   401
These improved principles of Delfi and Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete have already 
been used in a recent decision on admissibility in the case dealing with defamatory comments 
in the Internet - Pihl v. Sweden.  The matter concerned a blog post accusing the applicant of 402
being involved in a Nazi party. Although the blog allowed comments to be posted, it was 
clearly stated that such comments were not checked before publication and that commentators 
were responsible for their own statements.  Commentators were also requested to display 403
good manners and obey the law.  The day after publication of the post, an anonymous 404
person posted a comment calling the applicant “a real hash-junkie”.  The post and the 405
comment were removed and an apology with an explanation for the error published when the 
applicant notified the association of the inaccuracy of the post.  The applicant, however, 406
sued the association and claimed symbolic damages of approximately 0,10 EUR.    407
The Court observed that the comment about the applicant did not concern his political views 
and had nothing to do with the content of the blog post. It could therefore hardly have been 
anticipated by the association.  The Court also noted that, as concerns the alleged possibility 408
of still being able to find the comment via search engines, the applicant is entitled to 
request  that the search engines remove any such traces of the comment.  The Court 409 410
considered especially important that the comment, although offensive, did not amount to hate 
speech or incitement to violence and was posted on a small blog run by a non-profit 
association which took it down the day after the applicant’s request and nine days after it had 
been posted. Because of those reasons the Court found that the domestic courts acted within 
their margin of appreciation and struck a fair balance between the applicant’s rights under 
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Article 8 and the association’s opposing right to freedom of expression under Article 10.  411
The application was thus rejected.    412
The Court has used the basic principles of balancing the competing interests under Article 8 
and Article 10 as summarised in Delfi.  The circumstances of the case were also contrasted 413
to those of Delfi. For example, the association was a small non-profit association, unknown to 
the wider public, and it was thus unlikely that it would attract a large number of comments or 
that the comment about the applicant would be widely read as compared to a large news 
portal in Delfi.  In addition to this, the comment had been on the blog for about nine days in 414
total, as compared to Delfi, where the clearly unlawful comments were removed only about 
six weeks after their publication.   415
The Court also used principles of a case that was partially based on Delfi and discussed above 
- Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt. The Court found that expecting 
the association to assume that some unfiltered comments might be in breach of the law would 
amount to requiring excessive and impractical forethought capable of undermining the right to 
impart information via internet.  Furthermore, liability for third-party comments may have 416
negative consequences on the comment-related environment of an internet portal and thus a 
chilling effect on freedom of expression via Internet. This effect could be particularly 
detrimental for a non-commercial website.  However, one should not expect that to mean an 417
automatic immunity to be given to these types of websites, for the Court made it clear in 
Delfi, as discussed before, that the rights under Article 8 and Article 10 had to be balanced 
against each other in each individual case. This point of view is also supported by the fact that 
the Court stressed the importance of the particular factual matrix of Pihl by, for example, 
drawing multiple comparisons with the circumstances of Delfi and Magyar.  
Moreover, the principles of Delfi were used in a recent judgment Egill Einarsson v. Island. 
The applicant was a well-known person in Iceland who for years had published articles, blogs 
and books and appeared in films, on television and other media.  A picture of the applicant 418
was published on the front page of a newspaper that presented its readers with an interview 
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where the applicant discussed the rape accusation against him.  X took a copy of the picture 419
of the applicant, drew and wrote a comment on it, added the caption “Fuck you rapist bastard” 
in small letters under the picture, and posted the edited picture on his Instagram account. It 
was widely distributed and the applicant brought defamation proceedings against X.   420
The Court has considered the necessity and relevant rules for balancing Articles 8 and 10 of 
the Convention in respect to well-known persons and the risks posed by content and 
communications on the Internet that were summarised and described in Delfi  and Von 421
Hannover  (discussed above). There is thus a strong connection between Delfi, Tammer (as 422
an important source of the principles of principles later applied in Von Hannover judgment) 
and Egill Einarsson. The Court reminded that even persons known to the public have 
legitimate expectations of protection of, and respect for, their private life despite the limits to 
acceptable criticism being accordingly wider in case of an individual who is well-known.  423
The Court also noted that, in the light of the fact that the applicant was a well-known person 
and the impugned statement was a part of a debate concerning accusations of a serious 
criminal act, it was an issue of general interest.  Nevertheless, the Court found that Article 8 424
of the Convention must be interpreted to mean that persons, even disputed public persons that 
have instigated a heated debate due to their behaviour and public comments, do not have to 
tolerate being publicly accused of violent criminal acts without such statements being 
supported by facts. That was especially relevant in the light of the discontinuance of the 
criminal proceedings against the applicant just prior to the publication of the applicant’s 
newspaper interview.   425
The dissenting opinion of Judge Lemmens concerned one relevant aspect of this case - the 
question whether the expression “Fuck you rapist bastard” was a statement of fact or a value 
judgment. The judge believed that Supreme Court read the term in its context - the altered 
picture and the comment taken as a whole. By using the picture as the “medium” for his 
message, X was manifestly negatively and disapprovingly reacting to the interview. The judge 
noted that the Supreme Court’s assessment that in this context the word “rapist” had lost its 
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objective meaning and had to be understood as a swear word against the applicant  was 426
within its margin of appreciation. Having regard to the subsidiary nature of the European 
Court’s role, there was, in the judge’s opinion, no cogent reason to depart from this 
assessment. Because of those reasons the judge agreed to the Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
X had acted within the limits of his freedom of expression. In his opinion, the Supreme Court 
thus struck a fair balance between the competing rights at stake.   427
Coming back to the assessment of the wider impact of the case law of the ECtHR - its 
influence on the Luxembourg Court jurisprudence - it is noteworthy that Delfi is the only 
judgment under the scope of this thesis that the CJEU directly quoted in it’s judgment. This 
happened on one occasion  - in Dmitrii Konstantinovich Kiselev v. Council of the European 428
Union.  The CJEU did not apply any particular found in Delfi, but used it as an example  429 430
of the important role played by the media, in particular the audiovisual media, in modern 
society.  This allowed the CJEU to draw a conclusion that a large-scale media support for the 
actions and policies of the Russian Government destabilising Ukraine, provided, in particular 
during very popular television programmes, by a person appointed by a decree of President 
Putin as Head of RS, a news agency that the applicant himself describes as a “unitary 
enterprise” of the Russian State, could be covered by the criterion based on the concept of 
“active support”, provided that the resulting limitations on the freedom of expression comply 
with the other conditions that must be satisfied in order for that freedom to be legitimately 
restricted.  431
This analysis shows that the ECtHR has become more sensitive as regards the protection of 
private life, in particular the protection of personal data.  It is also reasonable to say that 432
Delfi provided a frame of reference for shaping media policy in EU Member States. As in 
Tammer, its factual basis is not overly connected to the country the case originated from. Delfi 
has already been quoted as an authority in judgments related to Island, Sweden and Hungary. 
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4.3. Effect of Delfi AS v. Estonia on Case Law of Supreme Court of Estonia 
The Supreme Court of Estonia used principles explained in Delfi only twice.   433
In its judgment in the case No 3-3-1-85-15 the Court found, similarly to the ECtHR in 
Delfi,  that the rights guaranteed under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention deserve equal 434
respect when balancing them in order to apply domestic law, in particular  when it comes to 
disclosure of personal data.  The Supreme Court of Estonia did not agree that Article 8 gives 435
an absolute protection that cannot be restricted by Article 10. The Court found that right to the 
freedom of speech can constitute a solid legal basis for restricting the right to respect for one's 
private and family life in media. Freedom of the press would be significantly limited if the 
media could process personal information and publish it only with the consent of a person. 
Similar line of reasoning can be found in the relevant national provision itself: personal data 
may be processed and disclosed in the media for journalistic purposes without the consent of 
the data subject, if there is predominant public interest therefore and this is in accordance with 
the principles of journalism ethics. Disclosure of data shall not cause excessive damage to the 
rights of a data subject. To sum up, the Courts shared the approach that in the event of a 
conflict, a balance must be struck between privacy and public interest and the rights of 
others.   436
In his opinion that concerned case No 3-2-1-37-15, the judge of the Supreme Court of 
Estonia, Jaak Luik, agreed to the position of the ECtHR in Delfi  that it was primarily for 437
the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic 
legislation. In addition to this, he noted that the Chamber was satisfied that the relevant 
provisions of the civil law – although they were quite general and lacked detail – along with 
the relevant case-law, made it clear that a media publisher was liable for any defamatory 
statements made in its publication.  438
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4.4. Delfi AS v. Estonia and Role of Intermediaries in Europe 
The conclusion of the Court can to some extent be confined to its own facts.  That would 439
limit the precedential value of Delfi. The Court emphasised that Delfi case relates to a large 
professionally managed Internet news portal run on a commercial basis which published news 
articles of its own and invited its readers to comment on them.  The Court also ruled that the 440
case did not concern other fora on the Internet where third-party comments could be 
disseminated, for example an Internet discussion forum or a bulletin board where users could 
freely set out their ideas on any topics without the discussion being channelled by any input 
from the forum’s manager; or a social media platform where the platform provider did not 
offer any content and where the content provider could be a private person running the 
website or a blog as a hobby.  It could be found useful to consider the criteria proposed in 441
joint concurring opinion of judges Raimondi, Karakas, De Gaetano and Kjølbro. The 
assessment of whether the news portal knew or ought to have known that clearly unlawful 
comments may be or have been published on the portal may take into account all the relevant 
specific circumstances of the case. They could include the nature of the comments in 
question, the context of their publication, the subject matter of the article generating the 
comments, the nature of the news portal in question, the history of the portal, the number of 
comments generated by the article, the activity on the portal, and how long the comments 
have appeared on the portal.  The judges found that in Delfi the nature of the comments in 442
question was clearly unlawful and they remained on the news portal for six weeks before they 
were removed. That resulted in a fact that the Court did not find it disproportionate to hold 
Delfi liable. In fact, not being aware of such clearly unlawful comments for such an extended 
period of time almost amounts to wilful ignorance, which cannot serve as a basis for avoiding 
civil liability.   443
On the other hand, the principles of Delfi were later used in some newer judgments.  Same 444
criteria were used for both news portals and a non-profit industry self-regulation body.  It 445
gives a reason to think that those principles may be applicable to other types of websites as 
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well, for example to large “hobby” and bulletin board websites (that were supposed to be 
beyond the scope of Delfi judgment) and consisting almost exclusively of user-generated 
content and relying heavily on advertising revenue. One typical example is Reddit,  where 446
users can create their own topics, choose what to post as the starting point for a conversation 
(as contrasted with news portals where the article provides the fodder for comments), 
comment on these posts, and up- or down-vote posts and comments based on what they like. 
Reddit also allows for advertisements to run on the main page and in subreddits.  The 447
ECtHR may hold that the importance of compensating the victim may outweigh the freedom 
of expression of the platform. However, one would expect immunity to be given to these 
types of websites, as they provide the strongest platform for user-generated content and 
therefore to speech.  That is partially confirmed by the approach the Court preferred in Pihl 448
- the comment was written on a small blog run by a non-profit association which took it down 
the day after the applicant’s request and nine days after it had been posted. 
By merely ascertaining the compatibility of domestic judicial decisions with the Convention, 
rather than taking the place of national courts, the Delfi judgment does not supersede the 
ability of service providers to rely on other defences available to them in domestic law.  449
National courts are only obliged to construe these defences in a manner that is compatible 
with the Convention, rather than being strictly bound by the Delfi reasoning. However, Delfi 
may yet be used as a persuasive authority before the national courts.  450
Delfi is also likely to influence a broader range of policy decisions involving the role of 
intermediaries in Europe. The European Court’s proposition that certain intermediaries should 
play an active role in minimizing the spread of particularly harmful content will resonate with 
European governments that request cooperation from the largest online intermediaries in 
preventing the spread of hate speech and extremist content.  Governments may not always 451
be directly censoring expression, but by putting pressure and imposing liability on those who 
control the technological infrastructure, they create an environment in which collateral or 
private-party censorship is the inevitable result.  Еntirely excluding intermediaries from any 452
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civil liability would not be compatible with the Convention. However, this does not mean 
only strict liability as an obligation to generally monitor third-party content.  The Court was 453
very cautious to note in this respect that certain circumstances may entitle Contracting States, 
but not oblige them, to impose such liability.  Because A is liable for someone else’s speech, 454
A has strong incentives to over-censor, to limit access, and to deny B’s ability to communicate 
using the platform that A controls. A problem from the standpoint of free expression may look 
like an opportunity for governments that cannot easily locate anonymous speakers and want to 
ensure that harmful or illegal speech does not propagate.    455
Another interesting aspect is that parties jointly liable for a particular harm have an interest in 
reducing their own shares of the burden. Any difficulty in identifying and pursuing speakers 
will result in greater expected liability for the content provider, so the latter has an incentive 
to facilitate the identification of anonymous speakers. To do so, content providers may collect 
user information and volunteer this information in the case of a lawsuit. Content providers 
might not be very keen to drag their users into court, because this may harm their business. 
But the ability to share the burden will surely result in some increase in the likelihood of data 
collection.  456
Collateral censorship “occurs when the state holds one private party A liable for the speech of 
another private party B, and A has the power to block, censor, or otherwise control access to 
B’s speech’’.  That results in strong chilling effects on the intermediaries. Faced with a risk 457
of being held liable for B's speech, an intermediary A is likely to stay on the side of safety and 
to censor content even if the conditions for limiting freedom of expression are not met  or to 458
simply disable comments. Social media operators have already institutionalised over-
censorship by allowing a policy of banning sites and posts which have been “reported”, 
without conducting a serious investigation into the matter. The policy adopted by Facebook is 
another victory for the troll mentality. Facebook requires (all) user-imposed censorship to take 
place in a legal environment that grants service providers immunity under the 
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Communications Decency Act 230(a). One can only imagine what will happen where there is 
no immunity.  459
Another possible cause of chilling effect is coinfluence of Delfi and the CJEU judgment 
Google Spain. The case involved two pages of the Catalonian newspaper La Vanguardia, 
which mentioned a Spanish national in connection with an auction to cover his debts. When 
the newspaper moved to an online format, Google indexed the pages, so they appeared in 
response to search queries for the persons name.  He requested that the AEPD  require La 460 461
Vanguardia and Google to modify their pages to remove his personal data.  Although the 462
AEPD rejected the complaint against the newspaper, it upheld the complaint against 
Google.  Google Inc. and Google Spain brought separate actions against the AEPD, which 463
the Spanish high court joined and referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the Data 
Protection Directive  and the “right to be forgotten”.  464 465
The CJEU considered that search engines are data controllers under Article 2 of the 
Directive  and a fair balance should be sought between the legitimate interest of Internet 466
users in having access to the information and the data subject’s fundamental rights. The data 
subject’s fundamental rights, as a general rule, overrode the interest of Internet users, but that 
balance might, however, depend on the nature of the information in question and its 
sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest of the public in having that 
information.  The CJEU held that in certain cases the operator of a search engine was 467
obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on the basis of a 
person’s name links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information 
relating to that person, even when its publication in itself on the web pages in question was 
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lawful.  That was so in particular where the data appeared to be inadequate, irrelevant or no 468
longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes for which they had been processed 
and in the light of the time that had elapsed.  The Court's reasoning sounds broad and could 469
apply to other scenarios as well. In fact, the ECtHR in Delfi could have relied on Google 
Spain language to justify holding Delfi strictly liable for the content of user-generated 
comments.  470
While both Delfi and Google Spain alone could have had widespread impact, the combination 
of them means that websites could be expected to control the content submitted to them as 
though they were the owners of the content. In particular, these judgments could lead to a 
dramatic chilling effect on user-generated content in the EU. As the petitioners and third-party 
interveners in Delfi argued,  regular enforcement of these responsibilities within Europe will 471
give website owners an incentive to implement prior restraint mechanisms or bar entirely 
user-generated content to avoid defamatory remarks. The Google Spain judgment would then 
encourage search engines to prioritize websites with less user-generated content, as these 
websites would be less likely to have information that Europeans would ask to be erased from 
the search results. The combined effect would be a decrease in the number of opportunities 
Europeans have to express themselves online, as well as a decrease in the likelihood that 
anyone would read what they did manage to say. Over time, the freedom of speech could shift 
from individuals to organizations, and from user-generated content to consumption-only 
websites like Netflix and closed-comment news portals.  472
This result is particularly unfortunate when one considers that free and low-cost platforms for 
user-generated content provide an outlet for many individuals with controversial but not 
unlawful views. This harms not only the speakers, but also the public.  Intermediaries play a 473
fundamental role in enabling Internet users to enjoy their right to freedom of expression and 
access to information.  The Court also dismissed the concern of the cost of employing 474
moderators to monitor content on the news portal.  The Internet is more than a uniquely 475
 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 468
González, para 88.
 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 469
González, para 93.
 M. E. Griffith, p 364.470
 Delfi AS v. Estonia, para 66-80 and 94-109.471
 M. E. Griffith, p 356.472
 M. E. Griffith, p 373.473
 Report to the Human Rights Council A/HRC/17/27, para 74.474
 M. E. Griffith, p 379.475
"62
dangerous novelty. It is a sphere of robust public discourse with novel opportunities for 
enhanced democracy. Comments are a crucial part of this new enhanced exchange of ideas 
among citizens.  476
The ECtHR appeared to ignore the argument from the applicants that what was at stake was 
not merely 320 EUR but rather the entire way in which it and similar portals did business. The 
cost to content hosts in applying more burdensome monitoring methods could be prohibitive 
either to the comments section or even to the website’s business plan itself.  Despite the 477
absence of automatic conflict between this ruling and the position under EU law, it is 
questionable whether this outcome is desirable from an Internet policy perspective. This case 
and its consequences will likely influence the review of intermediaries that the EU 
Commission is planning as part of its Digital Single Market strategy.   478
To sum up, Delfi is likely to have a wide impact on EU law. Since there is no case law 
concerning every kind of the multiple types of Internet platforms, the principles provided in 
Delfi would be revoked over and over again in order to establish the rules on liability and 
immunity for these websites. The Court is expected to rely on them to both apply the rules 
provided in Delfi and to distinguish cases on the facts, if needed. It is also likely to play a 
notable role as a persuasive authority not only before the courts, but also when it comes to 
political decisions. In addition to this, Delfi might result in a strong chilling effect on the 
intermediaries, freedom of speech and cause a rise in the likelihood of data collection. 
Moreover, active interest of the legal scholars, large amounts of analysis and the arguments 
mentioned above let one presume it is the judgment in the case where Estonia was the 
defendant state that has the biggest influence on the case law of the ECtHR,  and through 479
that on EU law. The same conclusion was also reached in legal literature.   480
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the Court’s dialogue with Estonia through its 
judgments, dealing with the applications submitted against the state, has influenced the law of 
EU Member States and EU law in general. The hypothesis of this written work is that Estonia 
has influenced the ECtHR case law and through that EU law. 
Within Europe both the Council of Europe and the European Union ensure human rights at 
the same supranational level. The CJEU has to regard the ECHR as one of the lawful criteria 
for examining the impact of EU Regulations and Directives in the specific field of human 
rights. Member States are also obliged to respect fundamental rights when implementing 
Community law. The case law of the ECtHR has often been cited by the Luxembourg judges 
in their decisions. Despite that, acts of the EU as such cannot be challenged before the Court 
because the EU is not a Contracting Party. They can, however, be successfully disputed before 
the CJEU if there is a breach of fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR.  
Those fundamental rights constitute general principles of the Union’s law under Article 6(3) 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. There is a presumption, however, that a State has not departed from 
the requirements of the Convention when it implements legal obligations flowing from its 
membership of the organisation, if an equivalent protection of fundamental rights is 
considered to be provided by the organisation. This presumption does not apply where the 
state has some discretion in its application of EU law. The two European Courts, the CJEU 
and the ECtHR, are expected to engage into a common European program on the fundamental 
rights protection.  
There are some possible limitations on the implementation of the principles of the case law of 
the ECtHR in Member States. These limitations could potentially diminish the practical value 
of the judgments against Estonia on a national level in Member States. The most important of 
them is that the final judgment of the Court is binding only in relation to the parties of 
particular proceedings. Thus, the legal status of the Strasbourg case law is diverse among the 
Contracting States. Despite those differences, the role of the case law of the Court for the 
development of national legal systems cannot be appreciated enough. Sometimes the Court 
uncovers serious structural problems that can only be solved through adaptation and 
amendment of the legal system and gives guidelines to these changes. Besides that, it 
increasingly supplements national human rights guarantees. Described impact, future and 
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present, in turn, creates a possibility for the ECtHR judgments in cases where Estonia was the 
defendant state to influence EU law. This, however, presupposes that some new principles of 
high practical value were developed in cases submitted against Estonia. 
Rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the 
Articles of the Convention. Essential to the rule of law principle of legality is embodied in 
Article 7 of the Convention: no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of 
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law at the time when it was committed. The principle of legality is multifaceted and also 
incorporates the principle of legal certainty - an offence must be clearly defined in law. When 
it comes to the judgments in which Estonia was the defendant state, the best example of the 
application of the principles described in this subchapter is the judgment of the ECtHR in the 
case Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2). In this case, the retroactive application of criminal law as well 
as the lack of clarity and foreseeability in the relevant criminal legislation amounted to a 
violation of Article 7(1) of the Convention. The legal rules given in Veeber (no. 2) were later 
used on many occasions, both to uphold the earlier principles given in the Court’s pervious 
case law and to develop new, more detailed approaches, in relation to particular cases 
adjudicated in the ECtHR. To sum up, if one wanted to mention aspects in which Estonian 
cases have been relevant for the development of interpretation and application of Convention 
rights, Article 7(1) would one of them.  
In the context of effective political democracy and respect for human rights mentioned in the 
Preamble to the Convention, freedom of expression is not only important in its own right, but 
also plays a central part in the protection of other rights under the Convention. Article 10(2) is 
applicable not only to “information”  or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. 
Freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR is not unlimited. The second 
paragraph of Article 10 lists nine legitimate purposes for the restrictions of the freedom of 
expression. One of them, “the protection of… rights of others”, has been frequently invoked 
to ascertain the degree to which the privacy or reputation and honour of public figures can be 
guaranteed. Tammer v. Estonia provides an excellent example of this principle in action and 
has remained one of the best-known cases emerging from Estonia. It is often referred to in 
textbooks and manuals dealing with the case law of the Strasbourg court. In this judgment the 
Court showed that that freedom of expression enjoyed by the press does not extend to idle 
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gossip about intimate or extra-marital relations merely serving to satisfy the curiosity of a 
certain readership. The Court has since quoted Tammer on many occasions, the most 
important being Von Hannover v. Germany and Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland. Both of 
them not only upheld the principles provided in Tammer, but noticeably contributed to their 
development. The factual basis of Tammer is universal enough not to be bound to Estonia 
only. Press continues to fulfil its function of a public watchdog, enjoying even bigger 
influence and reach as a part of contemporary media culture making it even more important to 
draw a line between freedom of expression and protection of a private life. This allows one to 
suppose the influence of Tammer will not decrease in near future, but is much more likely to 
grow. 
The right to a private life is also essential when it comes to emerging new technologies. The 
Court noted that user-generated expressive activity on the Internet provides an unprecedented 
platform for the exercise of freedom of expression. However, analysis at hand shows that the 
ECtHR has become more sensitive as regards the protection of private life, in particular the 
protection of personal data. The judgment of the ECtHR in Delfi helped to developed 
principles that help to ascertain the liability of Internet news portals. It is also reasonable to 
say that Delfi provided a frame of reference for shaping media policy in EU Member States. 
As in Tammer, its factual basis is not overly connected to the country the case originated 
from. Delfi has already been quoted as an authority in judgments related to Island, Sweden 
and Hungary. It is also noteworthy that Delfi is the only judgment under the scope of this 
thesis that the CJEU directly quoted in it’s judgment. Since there is no case law concerning 
every kind of the multiple types of Internet platforms, the principles provided in Delfi would 
be revoked over and over again in order to establish the rules on liability and immunity for 
these websites. It is also likely to play a notable role as a persuasive authority not only before 
the courts, but also when it comes to political decisions. In addition to this, there is also a 
probability that Delfi might result in a strong chilling effects on the intermediaries, freedom of 
speech and cause a rise in the likelihood of data collection. Morever, active interest of legal 
scholars towards Delfi and the arguments mentioned above let one suppose it is the judgment 
that has the biggest influence on the case law of the ECtHR, and through that on EU law, if 
compared to other cases in which Estonia was the defendant state in the ECtHR. The same 
conclusion has also been reached in legal literature. 
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To sum up, this thesis shows that there has indeed been an influence of the judgments and 
decisions of the ECtHR in which Estonia was the defendant state on the case law of the 
ECtHR. This case law can and is likely to influence both the law and the policy of the EU 
institutions and Member States. The biggest identified impact of these decisions concerned 
the freedom of expression. 
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EESTI SUHTES TEHTUD EUROOPA INIMÕIGUSTE KOHTU 
LAHENDITE MÕJU EUROOPA LIIDU ÕIGUSELE 
Resümee 
Pärast taasiseseisvumist avas Eesti ennast demokratiseerimisprotsessile. Selle käigus on Eesti 
ratifitseerinud Euroopa inimõiguste konventsiooni (EIÕK). EIÕK on aga elav instrument, mis 
vajab tõlgendamist tänapäeva tingimuste valguses. Pidev dialoog riigisiseste kohtute ja 
Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu (EIK) vahel on äärmiselt oluline inimõiguste arengu ja kaitse 
jaoks. 
Magistritöö  eesmärk  on  uurida,  kas  kohtupraktika  kaudu  toimuv EIK dialoog  Eestiga  on 
mõjutanud Euroopa Liidu (EL) ja selle liikmesriikide õigust. Töö hüpotees on väide, et Eesti 
suhtes tehtud lahendite kaudu toimuv EIK dialoog Eestiga on suutnud mõjutada ka Euroopa 
Liidu  (EL)  ja  selle  liikmesriikide  õigust.  Hüpoteesi  kontrollimiseks  on  vaja  eelkõige 
analüüsida,  kas  EIK  praktikal  on  õiguslikult  võimalik  mõjutada  EL  institutsioonide  ja 
liikmesriikide õigust. Samuti on oluline hinnata, kas see mõju on ka tegelikult avaldunud. 
Seejärel on vaja uurida, kuidas on mõjutanud Eesti suhtes tehtud EIK otsused EIK edaspidist 
praktikat.  
Käesoleva töö autor  ei  ole  kontrollinud,  kas  Eesti  suhtes  tehtud EIK otsuseid kasutati  ka 
liikmesriikide kohtutes või poliitiliste otsuste vastuvõtmisel. See on tingitud vajadusest täita 
tööle  ettenähtud  mahtu.  Samuti  eeldaks  vastupidine  lähenemine  sügavaid  teadmisi 
konkreetsete liikmesriikide õiguskorrast ning sotsiaal-poliitilisest kontekstist. 
Magistritöö jaoks valiti kolm olulisemat EIK otsust Eesti suhtes: Veeber v. Eesti, Tammer v. 
Eesti  ja  Delfi  v.  Eesti.  Otsuste  tähtsuse  hindamiseks  kasutati  EIK ametlikus  andmebaasis 
(HUDOC)  antud  kohtuotsuste  liigitust.  Olulisemad  lahendid  on  koondatud  raportitesse. 
Samuti viitas valitud kohtuotsuste tähtsusele asjaolu, et EIK on tihti kasutanud neid lahendeid 
oma hilisemas praktikas. Käesoleva töö autor võrdles EIÕK konkreetseid artikleid käsitlevate 
EIK otsuste mahtu ning Eesti suhtes tehtud lahendite osakaalu neis. Magistritöös kasutati ka 
üht  otsust  vastuvõetavuse  kohta,  Kolk   ja  Kislõi  v.  Eesti.  Sellele  on  EIK  viidanud  kõige 
rohkem, võrreldes teiste Eesti suhtes tehtud otsustega vastuvõetavuse kohta, mis käsitlesid 
sama EIÕK artikli  tõlgendamist.  Magistritöö autor  lähtus  ka  õiguskirjanduses  väljendatud 
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seisukohtadest  lahendite  olulisuse  kohta  ning  hindas,  mis  otsused  said  kõige  rohkem 
tähelepanu akadeemilistes ringkondades. 
Euroopas kaitsevad inimõigusi riigiüleselt nii Euroopa Nõukogu kui ka Euroopa Liit. Euroopa 
Nõukogu teeb seda EIÕK-ist lähtudes ning EIK kaudu. Euroopa Liit  tegutseb inimõiguste 
kaitsmise vallas Euroopa Liidu Kohtu kaudu (ELK). Kuigi EL ei ole EIÕK osapool, näitab 
ELK  kohtupraktika,  et  EL liikmesriigid  on  EL õiguse  rakendamisel  kohustatud  austama 
fundamentaalseid õigusi EL õiguse rakendamisel. Ka Euroopa Liidu lepingu ja Euroopa Liidu 
toimimise lepingu konsolideeritud versioonide artikkel 6(3) ütleb, et Euroopa inimõiguste ja 
põhivabaduste  kaitse  konventsiooniga  tagatud  ja  liikmesriikide  ühistest  põhiseaduslikest 
tavadest  tulenevad põhiõigused on liidu õiguse üldpõhimõtted.  Euroopa Liidu tegevus kui 
selline ei saa aga olla EIK-is vaidlustatud, kuna EL ei ole tervikuna EIÕK osapool. EL ei ole 
konventsiooniga magistritöö kirjutamise hetkeks liitunud. See tähendab, et EL liikmesriigid 
võivad  olla  kohustatud  vastutama  EL  jurisdiktsiooni  teostamise  tulemusel  tekkinud 
inimõiguste rikkumiste eest. Samas on EIK väljendanud seisukohta, et riikide tegevuse suhtes 
kehtib  eeldus,  et  riik  ei  ole  konventsiooni  nõuetest  kõrvale  kaldunud,  kui  ta  rakendab 
organisatsiooni  liikmelisusest  tulenevaid  juriidilisi  kohustusi,  tingimusel,  et  organisatsioon 
tagab EIÕK-ga samaväärset põhiõiguste kaitset. See eeldus ei ole aga absoluutne.
EIK otsus on siduv vaid konkreetse kohtumenetluse osapooltele. Seetõttu sõltub EIK praktika 
koht  riigisiseses  õiguses  kohalikest  põhiseaduslikest  normidest  ja  kohtupraktikast.  Sellele 
vaatamata  on  EIK  mõju  riigisisestele  õiguskordadele  olnud  ikkagi  märkimisväärne  ja 
järjepidev.  EIK  on  avastanud  ka  struktuurilisi  probleeme,  mida  saab  parandada  vaid 
õiguskorra  muutmise  kaudu,  ja  on  andnud  selleks  ka  suuniseid.  On  suur  tõenäosus,  et 
avastatud mõju suureneb veelgi, kuna EIK jätkab nõu andmist oma otsuste rakendamiseks 
ning nende järgimiseks kestva võimetuse kritiseerimist.
Veeber  v.  Eesti  (nr  2)  puudutas  seaduslikkuse  põhimõtte  tõlgendamist  EIÕK  artikli  7(1) 
raames. Sellest lähtuvalt ei või kedagi tunnistada süüdi kuriteos – teos või tegevusetuses, mis 
selle  toimepanemise  ajal  kehtinud  riigisisese  või  rahvusvahelise  õiguse  järgi  ei  olnud 
kuritegu. Samuti ei või kohaldada raskemat karistust kui kuriteo toimepanemise ajal ettenähtu. 
Vastavalt  kohtu  pretsedendiõigusele  saab  ainult  seadus  mingi  teo  tunnistada  kuriteoks  ja 
kehtestada  selle  eest  karistuse.  Karistusseadust  ei  saa  aga  süüdistatava  kahjuks  laialdaselt 
tõlgendada. Nendest printsiipidest tuleneb, et rikkumine peab olema üheselt määratletud. See 
tingimus on täidetud, kui isik saab vastava sätte sõnastusest ja vajadusel kohtute tõlgendamise 
abil  aru,  milliste  tegude  ja  tegevusetuse  eest  võetakse  ta  kriminaalvastutusele.  Lahendis 
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Veeber v. Eesti (nr 2) mõisteti kaebaja süüdi selle eest, et ta varjas tahtlikult, pidevalt ja suures 
ulatuses maksustamisobjekte ja esitas maksuametile kindlal ajaperioodil moonutatud andmeid 
oma äriühingu kulude kohta. Kuna kaebaja tegude toimepanemise algusaeg eelnes seaduse, 
mille alusel ta süüdi mõisteti, jõustumisele, siis hinnati tema tegevus jätkuvaks kriminaalseks 
seisundiks vältava kuriteo raames. Kohus osundas, et vastavalt relevantse riigisisese normi 
sõnastusele sai isikut kriminaalvastutusele võtta maksude tasumise kõrvalehoidumisest ainult, 
kui  samasuguse  rikkumise  eest  oli  süüdlase  suhtes  kohaldatud  halduskaristust.  Seega  oli 
maksude tasumisest kõrvalehoidumine kuriteo tingimuseks, ilma milleta kriminaalvastust ei 
saanud järgneda.  Kuna  puudus  vastaval  perioodil  ka  asjakohane  kohtupraktika,  ei  saanud 
kaebaja  eeldada,  et  tema  tegude  avastamine  tooks  endaga  kaasa  kriminaalkorras 
süüdimõistmise. 
Artikli 7(1) osas on EIK praktika vähene. Veel vähem kohtuasju puudutab olukordi, kus tegu 
oli kriminaliseeritud selle toimepanemise ja kohtuliku läbivaatamise vahel. Veeber v. Eesti (nr 
2)  on  aga  olnud  eeskuju  sarnaste  asjade  lahendamisel  ning  juba  varasemas  praktikas 
väljakujunenud  printsiipide  relevantsuse  kinnitamisel.  EIK  mõttekäik  kohtuasjas  Liivik  v. 
Eesti  oli  suuremas osas inspireeritud otsusest Veeber (nr 2).  Samuti hindas EIK kohtuasja 
Puhk v. Eesti asjaolusid Veeber (nr 2) antud printsiipidest lähtudes. Lahendites Penart v. Eesti 
ja Kolk ja Kislõi v. Eesti ei viidanud EIK otsusele Veeber (nr 2), kuid lähtus analoogsetest 
riigisisestest õigusreeglitest. Kõik viidatud otsused on andnud olulise panuse karistusõiguse 
tagasiulatuva kohaldamise keelu põhimõtte selgitamisse. Ei saa aga öelda, et Veeber (nr 2) 
mõjutas vaid neid otsusi, mis puudutasid Eestit või endiseid NSV Liidu riike. Seda kinnitavad 
näiteks EIK otsused asjades Rohlena v. Tšehhi Vabariik ning Aras v. Türgi. Veeber (nr 2) on 
mõjutanud  ka  Riigikohtu  praktikat  näiteks  õigusselguse  ja  jätkuva  kriminaalse  seisundi 
mõistete  sisustamise  osas.  Eriti  suur  olulisus  on  asjaolul,  et  Veeber  (nr  2)  inspireeris 
Riigikohut  tunnistama  teistmise  alusena  EIK  poolt  on  avastatud  rikkumise,  ka  enne 
asjakohase  normi  vastuvõtmist  parlamendi  poolt.  Võib  eeldada,  et  analoogselt  suudaksid 
käituda  ka  teiste  EL liikmesriikide  kohtud.  Samas  on  aga  tõenäolisem ning  praktikas  ka 
kinnitatud, et riigisisesed kohtud ootavad ikkagi EIK otsust rikkumise kohta konkreetselt oma 
riigi suhtes, et alles siis võtta kirjeldatud võimaluse sisse.  
Palju detailsem oli EIK pretsedendiõigus väljendusvabaduse puhul (EIÕK artikkel 10). See 
tagab ka poliitilise arutelu vabaduse, mis on demokraatliku ühiskonna tuum. Seejuures on 
oluline  ka  ajakirjanduse  panus  üldist  huvi  pakkuvate  küsimuste  väljaselgitamise  ja 
kajastamise vormis. Väljendusvabaduse kaitseobjektiks on kirjutatud või öeldud sõnad; pildid 
ja tegevused; nii informatsiooni sisu kui ka vorm. Artikli 10(2) ettenähtud erandeid arvestades 
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kehtib see ka selliste ideede suhtes, mis võivad solvata, šokeerida või häirida. Seda nõuab 
pluralism,  tolerantsus  ja  avatud  mõttelaad,  milleta  ei  oleks  demokraatlikku  ühiskonda. 
Sõnavabadusõigusesse sekkumine on vastuolus EIÕK artikliga 10, välja arvatud juhul, kui see 
on fikseeritud seaduses, sellel on artiklis 10(2) nimetatud õigustatud eesmärk või eesmärgid 
ning see on demokraatlikus ühiskonnas vajalik nende eesmärkide saavutamiseks. 
Tammer v. Estonia on suurepärane ja tuntud näide õigustatud eesmärgi mõiste sisustamisest. 
Selles  asjas  mõisteti  kaebaja  süüdi  solvavate  märkuste  eest,  mida  ta  ajakirjanikuna  tegi 
ajaleheintervjuus,  mis  käsitles  V.  Laanaru,  tuntud  poliitiku  abikaasat,  isiklike  mälestuste 
avaldamise  küsimust.  Hoolimata  tema  jätkuvast  seotusest  erakonnaga,  ei  pidanud  EIK 
tuvastatuks, et vaidlusaluste sõnade kasutamist oleks õigustanud avalik huvi. EIK leidis, et 
kaebaja oleks saanud sõnastada Laanaru käitumise kriitika, kasutamata solvavaid väljendeid 
“rongaema”  ja  “abielulõhkuja”.  EIK  arvestas  ka  väikse  trahvisummaga,  mis  kaebajale 
karistusena  mõisteti.  Eeltoodut  arvesse  võttes  leidis  EIK,  et  kaebaja  süüdimõistmine  ja 
karistus  ei  olnud  ebaproportsionaalsed  taotletava  õigustatud  eesmärgiga.  Seega  võis 
põhjendatult  pidada  kaebaja  sõnavabadusõigusesse  sekkumist  demokraatlikus  ühiskonnas 
vajalikuks, et kaitsta kaasinimeste mainet või õigusi konventsiooni artikli 10(2) tähenduses. 
Hilisemas praktikas kasutas EIK otsust Tammer v. Eesti ka selleks, et kinnitada üldisemaid 
artikli 10 tõlgendamisega seotud õigusreeglite asjakohasust. Samuti kinnitas EIK printsiipi, et 
tema ülesanne järelevalve teostamisel ei ole asuda riigisiseste võimude asemele, vaid kogu 
kohtuasja silmas pidades vaadata artikli 10 alusel läbi riigisiseste võimude otsused, mida nad 
on teinud oma suvamäära piires.  Palju  olulisem on aga Tammer v.  Eesti  kasutamine  EIK 
pretsedendiõiguse edaspidiseks arendamiseks. 
EIK  kasutas  samu  põhjendusi  ja  üldpõhimõtteid  nagu  Tammer  v.  Eesti  lahendis 
Von Hannover v. Saksamaa. EIK jõudis järeldusele, et inimese tuntus ei ole piisav tegur, et 
õigustada  sissetungi  eraellu.  Kohtud  peavad  analüüsima  publikatsiooni  olemust  ja  selle 
tähtsust ühiskonnale ehk avaliku huvi olemasolu. Von Hannover v. Saksamaa (nr 2) faktilised 
asjaolud  olid  varasema  kohtuasjaga  võrreldes  natuke  muutunud.  Publikatsioonid  ei 
puudutanud nüüd mitte printsessi vaba aja veetmist ja isiklikku elu laiemas plaanis, vaid tema 
tegevuste valikut ajal, kui Monaco vürst oli tõsiselt haigestunud. Viimane asjaolu põhjustas 
avaliku huvi  olemasolu.  Riigisisesed kohtud uurisid asja  otsustamisel  ka avaldatud fotode 
tegemise tingimusi. EIK nõustus sellise lähenemisega ning kinnitas, et see on üks olulistest 
teguritest,  mis  tasakaalustab  väljendusvabadust  ja  õigust  eraelu  kaitsele.  Kahes  viidatud 
otsuses välja kujundatud kriteeriumid on saanud EIK pretsedendiõiguse oluliseks osaks. 
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Lahenditele  Von  Hannover  v.  Saksamaa  ja  Tammer v.  Eesti  viidati  ka  teises  olulises  EIK 
otsuses – Karhuvaara ja Iltalehti v. Soome. Taotluse esitanud ajaleht avaldas artikleid Soome 
parlamendi  liikme  ning  ühtlasi  haridus-  ja  kultuurikomisjoni  esimehe  abikaasa  suhtes 
toimunud kriminaalmenetluse kohta, mis käsitles joobeseisundis vääritu käitumisega seotud 
juhtumeid,  sealhulgas  rünnakut  politseiametniku suhtes.  EIK märkis,  et  poliitiku  abikaasa 
süüdimõistmine võib mõjutada inimeste hääletuskavatsusi.  Seetõttu esines viidatud otsuses 
avaliku huvi element. EIK arvestas määratud trahvide suurusega (37 365 eurot)  ning  leidis, 
et riigisisesed kohtud ei suutnud leida õiglast tasakaalu konkureerivate õiguste vahel. 
Õigus eraelule on aktuaalne ka uute tehnoloogiatega seoses. Hiljutises lahendis Delfi AS v. 
Eesti tuvastati, et uudisteportaal võib vastutada anonüümsete laimavate kommentaaride eest. 
Digitaalses keskkonnas on igal väljendil vahetu ja ulatuslik mõju. Suurkoda põhjendas otsust 
järgmiselt:  tegemist  oli  äärmuslike  vihakõnet  ja  vägivalda  õhutavate  kommentaaridega 
uudisteportaalis  avaldatud  artikli  kohta;  kaebaja  kutsus  lugejaid  kommenteerima 
majandusliku  kasu  saamiseks;  anonüümsete  kommentaaride  tegelike  autorite  vastutusele 
võtmine  ei  kujutanud  endast  reaalset  alternatiivi;  Delfi  võetud  meetmed  kommentaaride 
eemaldamiseks olid olnud ebapiisavad ja Delfilt välja mõistetud hüvitis 320 eurot ei käinud 
kindlasti üle jõu suurele äriühingule, jätkuvalt Eesti suurimale internetiportaalile. Suurkoda 
leidis, et asjakohased riigisisesed normid koos kohtupraktikaga tagasid võimaliku vastutuse 
ettenähtavuse. EIK nõustus Eesti kohtute otsusega mitte rakendada e-kaubanduse direktiivi 
ülevõtmiseks  kasutatud  infoühiskonna  teenuse  seaduse  eriregulatsiooni,  kuna  erinevalt 
kaebaja tegevusest  puudutas viimane üksnes tehnilise,  automaatse ja  passiivse iseloomuga 
tegevust, ning et kaebaja eesmärk ei olnud üksnes vahendusteenuse pakkumine.
EIK  on  korduvalt  tsiteerinud  Delfi  otsust  oma  praktikas,  et  kinnitada  pretsedendiõiguse 
varasemaid põhimõtteid. Nende hulka kuulub näiteks õigusnormide täpsuse ja ettenähtavuse 
nõue;  vajadus  tasakaalustada  sõnavabadust  ja  eraelu  kaitset;  traditsiooniliste  trükiste  ja 
audiovisuaalse  meedia  seaduslike  omaduste  eraldamise  reeglid.  EIK tõi  esile  ka  interneti 
olulist  rolli  teabe  levitamise  hõlbustamisel  ning  rõhutas,  et  ajakirjandusele  ettenähtud 
kaitsemeetmed on ühiskonna jaoks eriti olulised.
Otsustes  Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete  ja  Index.hu Zrt  v.  Ungari  ning   Pihl  v. 
Rootsi  lähtus  EIK  lahendis  Delfi  AS  v.  Eesti  väljendatud  seisukohtadest  ning  arendas 
internetiportaali  tsiviilvastutusele  võtmise  reegleid  seoses  publikatsioonide  all  postitatud 
laimavate  kommentaaridega.  Delfi  otsusega  võrreldes  jõudis  EIK vastupidisele  järeldusele 
Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete otsuses, kuna solvavad ja vulgaarsed kommentaarid 
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ei kujutanud endast vihakõnet ega vägivalla õhutamist. Teine oluline erinevus seisnes selles, 
et Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete käsitles juriidilise, mitte füüsilise isiku laimamist. 
Hiljem  lähtus  EIK  samadest  printsiipidest  ka  uuemate  kohtuasjade  puhul,  mis  samuti 
panustasid  internetiportaali  tsiviilvastutuse  tuvastamise  reeglite  väljatöötamisse,  näiteks 
tuntud inimeste suhtes avaldatud solvavate kujutiste ja märkustega internetis. 
Vaatamata  sellele,  et  Delfi  AS  v.  Eesti  on  mõjutanud  ka  Riigikohtu  praktikat,  on  palju 
märkimisväärsem suur tähelepanu, mida sai otsus õiguskirjanduses. 
Delfi  otsusel  on  tõenäoliselt  laiaulatuslik  mõju  EL  õigusele.  Kuna  hetkel  puudub  EIK 
kohtupraktika,  mis  käsitleks  iga  konkreetset  tüüpi  veebiplatvormide  vastutusele  võtmise 
reegleid,  võib  eeldada,  et  Delfi  lahendis  sätestatud  üldisi  põhimõtteid  ja  neist  tuletatud 
printsiipe  kasutatakse  ka  edaspidi  ning  seda  üha  rohkem  ja  rohkem.  Samuti  võib  EIK 
seisukoht Delfi otsuses mõjutada ka teiste liikmesriikide poliitilisi otsuseid. On ka tõenäoline, 
et  veebiportaalid  kas  keelavad  kommentaaride  postitamise  (et  kaitsta  ennast  võimalike 
tagajärgete  eest),  teevad  kommenteerimise  reegleid  rangemateks,  kasutavad  tõhusaid 
automatiseeritud tsensuurimehhanisme kommentaaride filtreerimiseks,  välistades ka inetute 
kommentaaride  postitamise,  või  suurendavad  andmete  kogumist,  et  vajadusel  esitada 
kommentaare kirjutanud isiku vastu tsiviilõiguslikke nõudeid. See võib aga mõjuda pärssivalt 
sõnavabadusele  veebikeskkonnas.  Õigusteadlaste  aktiivne  huvi  ja  eespool  nimetatud 
argumendid  võimaldavad  oletada,  et  Delfi  otsusel  on  olnud  suurim  mõju  EIK 
pretsedendiõigusele  ja  selle  kaudu  ka  EL  õigusele,  võrreldes  teiste  Eesti  suhtes  tehtud 
lahenditega.
Teostatud analüüs näitab, et EIK lahendid Eesti suhtes on tõepoolest suutnud mõjutada EIK 
pretsedendiõigust. See on toimunud nii juba olemasolevate printsiipide edasiarendamise kui 
ka uute reeglite sõnastamise vormis.  Kõige suurem on Eesti  suhtes tehtud lahendite mõju 
sõnavabaduse valdkonnas. EIK praktika on pikka aega mõjutanud ka EL liikmesriikide õigust 
ning  EL  institutsioonid  on  kohustatud  arvestama  EIÕK  artiklitele  EIK  praktikas  antud 
tõlgendustega. Sellest võib järeldada, et Eesti suhtes tehtud lahendid, eriti olulisemad neist, 
mõjutavad ka EL ja liikmesriikide õigust.  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ABBREVIATIONS
ECHR        European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR       European Court of Human Rights 
EU             European Union 
CJEU         Court of Justice of the European Union 
TEU           Treaty on European Union 
TEEC         Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
USSR         Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
MP             Member of Parliament 
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